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Abstract 
The EU has been a rare example of a consistent global leadership on climate change. At a time 
when governments around the world are reluctant to face the challenges of climate change 
mitigation, the EU was widely praised for helping to push states towards an ambitious Paris 
Agreement. This thesis asks what influenced the EU’s behaviour at the 2015 Paris international 
climate negotiations (COP21). To answer this it undertakes an inductive case study of COP21 
and the intra-EU negotiations that led up to it. It focuses on the EU’s positions on climate 
mitigation proposals and more specifically greenhouse gas reductions. The thesis argues that 
the three-level game, incorporating national, supranational (EU), and international (UNFCCC) 
negotiating games, is superior to other theoretical frameworks for explaining the EU’s 
behaviour. It shows that EU member states adopted positions based on political pressures at a 
national level, but also took into account how they would be received at a supranational level 
and how they could eﬀect the international negotiations. Ignoring any one of the levels leads to 
an incomplete analysis of the factors influencing EU climate policy. Throughout the thesis I 
develop the three-level game, building on Putnam’s two-level game, as a framework for 
analysing the EU’s behaviour in international climate negotiations and challenge the 
mainstream, EU-centric explanations for EU climate policy.
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Notes on Measurements 
Greenhouse gas emissions measurements 
All percentage greenhouse gas emissions reductions referenced are assumed to be percentage 
reductions from 1990 levels unless otherwise stated. 

Global warming measurements 
All degrees celsius (℃) warming measurements referenced are assumed to be above pre-
industrial levels.

	  7
1. Introduction  
On the 14th December 2015 Miguel Arias Cañete, the European Union’s Commissioner for 
Energy and Climate Action, told the gathering press at the 21st Conference of Parties (COP21) 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris that the 
conference result was "a major win for Europe and its allies.”  Cañete was not far from the 1
mark. The Paris Agreement reflects many of the EU’s key priorities. It is a legally binding, 
universal agreement with 195 parties at all stages of their development process. It also 
references keeping global warming to at least below 2℃, but preferably below 1.5℃, includes 
strong accountability and transparency measures, and a five yearly review of parties’ nationally 
determined commitments. These wins are puzzling as the EU is often viewed as an ineﬀective 
actor on the international stage, too caught up with internal coordination to negotiate 
eﬀectively.  Moreover, in international climate negotiations we have become accustomed to 2
ambitious actors being rebuﬀed by intransigent major greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters. Yet 
against the odds the EU, which went into the Paris negotiations with one of the most ambitious 
intended nationally determined commitments (INDCs) and one of the most demanding list of 
negotiating aims, was fairly successful. 
3
This thesis asks what influenced the EU’s behaviour at COP21. It argues that the EU’s 
behaviour is best understood with reference to a three-level climate negotiation game. At a 
member state level, governments are influenced by a range of political and economic factors to 
take particular positions on climate negotiations. At an EU or supranational level, member 
states compete to have EU policy reflect their preferences. The EU takes a negotiating 
mandate from its member states to international negotiations and attempts to achieve an 
 Miguel Arias Cañete. Historic climate deal in Paris: speech by Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete at the 1
press conference on the results of COP21 climate conference in Paris SPEECH/15/6320. Brussels: 
European Commission, 2015. 
 Louise Van Schaik, "The sustainability of the EU’s model for climate diplomacy," The new climate 2
policies of the European Union: internal legislation and climate diplomacy  (2010): 269.

Stavros Afionis, "The European Union as a negotiator in the international climate change regime," 
International environmental agreements: politics, law and economics 11, no. 4 (2011): 346.
 Sebastian Oberthür and Lisanne Groen, "Explaining goal achievement in international negotiations: the 3
EU and the Paris Agreement on climate change," Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 5 (2018): 
714-16.
	  8
outcome that closely resembles that mandate. At each level negotiators are aware of what may 
happen at other levels of the game and so adjust their negotiating aims, sometimes scaling 
their ambition up in the hope of incentivising other actors to take more substantial action, 
sometimes scaling their ambition down to achieve compromises and avoid being ignored at 
other levels of the negotiations. The outcomes at any given level cannot be fully explained 
without reference to the dynamics at other levels. 

This thesis makes a number of contributions to the literature on EU policymaking and 
international climate negotiations. It develops the three-level game, building on Putnam’s two-
level game, as a framework for analysing climate policymaking and negotiations.  Where the 4
three-level game has been applied to EU climate politics before it has typically only been a 
passing reference by scholars.  Moreover, it has not been applied to the Paris negotiations. It 5
also attempts to bridge the gap between EU climate policymaking literature and international 
relations (IR) scholarship on the EU in international climate negotiations by drawing on both to 
explain the EU’s behaviour in Paris. While connections between the two literatures have been 
recognised, particularly in debates about EU ‘actorness’, the two literatures remain relatively 
compartmentalised, where in fact they have many complementary features. Finally, this thesis 
adds to existing literature on the outcome of COP21. 

Having situated the thesis in academic literature above, this chapter will explain why it is 
worthwhile studying EU climate politics before discussing the research approach and outlining 
what later chapters will discuss. 

 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International 4
Organization 42, no. 3 (1988).
 Loren R. Cass, "The Indispensable Awkward Partner: The United Kingdom in European Climate Policy," 5
in Europe and Global Climate Change: Politics, Foreign Policy and Regional Cooperation, ed. Paul G. 
Harris (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007).

Paul G. Harris, Europe and Global Climate Change: Politics, Foreign Policy and Regional Cooperation 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007).
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Why study EU climate policy?  
Climate change is one of the greatest threats governments face globally. However few 
countries have consistently advocated for ambitious action to address climate change. The EU 
has been a rare example of consistent global leadership on climate change.  In 2019 6
Germanwatch (an environmental NGO) ranked the EU 16th on its Climate Performance Index, 
and gave it a mark of 96.8 out of 100 for its international climate policies.  The EU has also 7
been one the three most recognised ‘leaders’ (alongside the US and China) in all of Parker, 
Karlsson and Hjerpe’s annual surveys of conference of parties to the UNFCCC Conference of 
Parties (COPs) attendees between 2008 and 2015.  
8
This leadership has continued despite significant set backs in international climate 
negotiations. After the US announced it would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the EU continued 
with the ratification process and undertook intensive lobbying to convince other countries to 
ratify the Protocol, culminating in a deal with Russia to support its bid for WTO membership in 
exchange for ratification of the Protocol.  This brought the Kyoto Protocol into force. After a 9
disastrous COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, where EU oﬃcials were literally locked out of the 
final agreement negotiations and the accord was rejected by the COP plenary, the EU stepped 
up in Durban in 2010, oﬀering to unilaterally commit to a second Kyoto Protocol commitment 
period in exchange for launching negotiations for a new “legally binding agreement that 
 Sebastian Oberthür and Claire Roche Kelly, "EU leadership in international climate policy: 6
achievements and challenges," The International Spectator 43, no. 3 (2008): 35.

Rüdiger K.W. Wurzel, Duncan Lieﬀerink, and James Connelly, "Introduction: European Union climate 
leadership," in The European Union in International Climate Change Politics: Still Taking a Lead?, ed. 
James Connelly, Duncan Lieﬀerink, and Rudiger Wurzel (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2017).

Charles F Parker, Christer Karlsson, and Mattias Hjerpe, "Assessing the European Union’s global climate 
change leadership: from Copenhagen to the Paris Agreement," Journal of European Integration 39, no. 2 
(2017): 239.
 Germanwatch, Country Scorecard: European Union (28), <https://www.climate-change-performance-7
index.org/sites/default/files/documents/european_union_28_scorecard_ccpi_2019_0.pdf>, accessed 9 
September 2019. 
 Parker, Karlsson, and Hjerpe, "Assessing the European Union’s global climate change leadership: from 8
Copenhagen to the Paris Agreement," 245.
 Wurzel, Lieﬀerink, and Connelly, "Introduction: European Union climate leadership," 6.9
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included all major emitters” to conclude in 2015.  Prior to COP21 the EU undertook an 10
unprecedented diplomatic campaign to raise ambitions leading up to the conference, and 
ultimately secured a deal that closely resembled its negotiating goals.  That record of 11
achievement sets the EU apart from other actors.

Given the urgency of addressing global climate change, political science research should try to 
provide insights concerning what will cause states to take action on climate change. To that 
end, any actor with a track record of climate leadership like the EU’s is worthy of attention 
because of the potential insights that research may bring about how to catalyse global climate 
action. 

Research design

Discussing the EU’s behaviour in UNFCCC negotiations presents a logistical challenge. There 
are 28 member states in the EU and a bewildering array of sub-state actors involved in the 
climate politics of each member state. Tracking each one’s behaviour would be impractical. 
Consequently, this thesis does a number of things to sharpen the analytical focus. Firstly, it 
focuses on a case study of COP21. This was one of the highest profile COPs, so there is a rich 
array of political statements, news reports, conference summaries and academic writings on 
the conference that allow the thesis to assess the impact of diﬀerent factors on the 
negotiations eﬀectively. The case study itself tracks three inter-related negotiations: EU level 
negotiations over the EU’s 2030 climate and energy targets, which became the EU’s INDC at 
the summit; EU negotiations over the EU’s negotiating mandate for COP21; and the 
international negotiations at COP21. The agreements about the EU’s INDC and negotiating 
mandate influenced how the EU behaved at COP21 and consequently are included in the 
 Karin Bäckstrand and Ole Elgström, "The EU's role in climate change negotiations: from leader to 10
‘leadiator’," Journal of European Public Policy 20, no. 10 (2013): 1381.
 John Vogler, "Global Climate Politics: Can the EU be an Actor?," in The European Union in 11
International Climate Change Politics: Still Taking a Lead?, ed. James Connelly Rudiger K.W. Wurzel, 
Duncan Lieﬀerink (London: Routledge, 2016), 26-27.

Oberthür and Groen, "Explaining goal achievement in international negotiations: the EU and the Paris 
Agreement on climate change," 714-15.
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thesis. These three sets of negotiations span a time period from around January 2014 to 
December 2015. 

Case study methodologies emphasise explaining a small number of occurrences in great detail 
rather than aiming to infer causal relationships from a larger number of less-closely examined 
occurrences. According to Yin, case studies can investigate an occurrence “in depth and 
within its context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context may 
not be evident.”  He also believes that they can provide insights into situations where there 12
are “more variables of interest than data points”. These strengths have made case study 13
research a popular methodology in climate politics literature. 

Steinberg and VanDaveer observe that environmental problems involve “a bewildering and 
often unintelligible array of social relationships.”  Klinsky similarly notes studies involving 14
climate change are confronted with the problem’s “boggartness” (a reference to the 
shapeshifting monster from Harry Potter). Diﬀerent social, economic and political concerns 
appear depending on what angle you look at the problem and the context in which you situate 
it.  In research conditions like these, the power of case studies to situate events within 15
context, explore multiple explanations for policy outcomes, and establish causality where there 
are many concurrently operating variables, becomes particularly useful. 

Singular case studies are often critiqued for lacking the “comparisons necessary for 
addressing larger issues of causality and theory generalisation.”  This is not a primary concern 16
for this thesis. It aims to assess the suitability of the three level game model for explaining the 
 Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Method, 5th ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2014), 16.12
 Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Method, 17-19.13
 Paul F. Steinberg and Stacy D. Vandeveer, "Comparative Theory and Environmental Practice: Toward 14
Doubly Engaged Social Science," in Comparative Environmental Politics: Theory, Practise and 
Prospects, ed. Paul F. Steinberg and Stacy D. Vandeveer (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2012), 379.
 Sonja Klinsky, "Not Just a Case Study: Strategies for Researching Climate Change Politics," in A 15
Research Agenda for Global Environmental Politics, ed. Peter Dauvergne and Justin Alger (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2018), 126.
 Mark Purdon, "Advancing Comparative Climate Change Politics: Theory and Method," Global 16
Environmental Politics 15, no. 3 (2015): 8.
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EU’s behaviour during the COP21 negotiations using an inductive, single case study research 
method. While I would argue that many of the negotiating patterns and influences uncovered 
by this thesis may be useful for analysing other EU negotiations, gaining a greater 
understanding of the EU’s behaviour at this important international climate conference is an 
independent benefit of this research. 

The second feature designed to improve its analytical focus of this thesis is that it tracks 
specific EU member states throughout the process: France, Germany, the UK and Poland. 
These do not constitute formal case studies, but rather are running touchstones through the 
thesis. These countries were selected after exploratory research because they were highly 
active players in EU negotiations leading up to COP21, both in advocating for aggressive and 
more restrained climate action. This thesis does not claim that they are perfectly reflective of 
EU member state behaviour in climate negotiations (given the enormous diﬀerences between 
EU member states it is unclear that any combination of states would be perfectly 
representative of that). Instead they are used to illustrate the way that national, supranational 
and international factors are connected in international climate negotiations, and influence 
states to take both pro- and anti-climate action stances. 

The third feature of this thesis is that it limits discussion to mitigation policies, specifically 
policies for reducing GHG emissions, and accountability measures designed to ensure those 
reductions occur. There are many issues discussed in international climate negotiations: 
climate finance, adaption, and technology transfers to name just a few. However, for the sake 
of clarity, this thesis is limited to mitigation policy discussions, while acknowledging those 
discussions exist within a broader context that includes other issues.

The fourth important methodological feature of this thesis is that it predominantly analyses the 
actions of political elites, specifically EU commissioners, member state ministers, prime 
ministers, heads of state, and senior negotiators. This is firstly because they are the ones 
making the decisions in negotiations and voting in the EU Council (the Council) and UNFCCC. 
Hence, these actors are at the heart of the climate negotiations process. Secondly, as 
Eckersely argues
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“the text and talk of the political executive … serves as the linchpin between domestic 
politics and international diplomacy; [it] enjoys a privileged platform from which to narrate 
the meaning of national identity, national interests, and international responsibilities and 
role conceptions; and provide the primary cues for media reporting on national and 
international climate politics.”  
17
To the extent that states look to gauge each other’s motives and negotiating positions, they are 
likely to look to the signals given by political executives and lead negotiators. For that reason, 
they deserve attention. 

Thesis outline

This thesis will proceed as follows. Chapter two explains what the three-level game is and why 
it is superior to the dominant theories of EU policymaking (liberal intergovernmentalism and 
multi-level governance). It also refutes constructivist critiques of rationalism. Chapter three 
discusses the EU-level negotiations over the bloc’s 2030 climate and energy targets. It argues 
that member states balanced domestic pressures against a desire to prompt non-EU states to 
be ambitious at COP21. This informed the compromises made. Chapter four examines the 
negotiations over the EU’s negotiating mandate for COP21. It looks at the various inclusions 
and exclusions from the mandate, arguing that they were influenced by both the political 
constraints on member states and EU concerns about how its actions would influence 
international negotiations. Chapter five analyses the EU’s behaviour during COP21. It 
particularly explains how the EU’s ability to engage in climate diplomacy, build alliances, 
compromise and negotiate eﬀectively all depended on EU factors, as well as showing how the 
international environment helped the EU reach its preferred outcomes at COP21. Chapter six 
summarises research findings and presents avenues for future research.

 Robyn Eckersley, "National identities, international roles and the legitimation of climate leadership: 17
Germany and Norway compared," Environmental Politics 25, no. 1 (2016): 182.
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2. Theoretical Review of the Three-Level Game 
This chapter explains why the three level game is the most appropriate theory to use for 
analysing EU and international climate negotiations. It begins by outlining Putnam’s two-level 
game, before explaining why it needs to be augmented to a three-level game to analyse a 
supranational entity. It then operationalises the three-level game, explaining what the ‘rules of 
the game’ are at the EU and international levels by drawing from IR and EU policymaking 
literature. The chapter next demonstrates why EU-centric theories, particularly liberal 
intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance should not be the starting points for this 
thesis. Finally, it rebuts constructivist critiques of rationalism. 

Putnam’s Two-Level Game 
Putnam’s two-level game is a rationalist account of how international agreements are made 
and why some parties may have more negotiating leverage than others. Putnam suggests that 
negotiators are simultaneously playing two ‘games’ during international negotiations. The first 
is a domestic game. The negotiator must try to maximise the domestic appeal of any deal 
because it will have to be approved by domestic institutions, and political leaders who want to 
be re-elected. The second is an international game. The negotiator must agree to some of the 
other party’s demands, or else they will walk away from the negotiations and leave the 
negotiator with nothing. Every move they make has consequences for both games, and 
“moves that are rational for a player at one board ... may be impolitic for that same player at 
the other board.” 
18
The range of agreements acceptable to a negotiator is their “win-set”. In order to reach an 
agreement, negotiators must reach a compromise that falls within both win-sets. Putnam 
claims that, all else being equal, a negotiator with a smaller win-set can extract more 
favourable terms than one with a larger win-set.  A negotiator’s domestic win-set is determined 
 Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," 434.18
	  15
by the domestic ratification requirements of that state, the preferences of powerful domestic 
actors, and how many possible coalitions there are that would allow a negotiator’s deal to be 
ratified. 
19
Win-sets can change through negotiations. Assuming that the costs of not reaching a deal are 
high, a skilled negotiator can realign their potential coalitions of domestic interests by 
threatening that they must accept position x because no better position will gain international 
approval, while simultaneously persuading the other negotiator they must accept position x 
because no better option will gain domestic approval.  This allows them to gain the most 20
favourable deal possible.

Expanding the two-level game 
Despite the strengths of the two-level game, it has two problems when applied to EU climate 
policy. The first is that the two-level framework “may lead observers to overlook other 
important levels of political analysis” that do not fall into the strict boxes of the domestic or 
international games.  To avoid this, the theory should be expanded to a ‘three-level game’ 21
incorporating a supranational negotiation level. Putnam acknowledges the possibility of multi-
level games, citing the European Community as an area of study that could benefit from that 
approach.  Owen and Walker utilise three levels of analysis in their study of the causes of the 22
‘leave’ vote in the Brexit referendum and subsequent negotiating tactics of the May 
government.  Collinson’s analysis of EU trade policy-making explicitly utilised a three-level 23
 Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," 437-43.19
 Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," 452-53.20
 Anthony R. Zito, Creating Environmental Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave 21
Macmillan, 2000), 15.
 Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," 449.22
 Erica Owen and Stefanie Walter, "Open economy politics and Brexit: insights, puzzles, and ways 23
forward," Review of International Political Economy 24, no. 2 (2017).
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game framework, with international, EU and domestic games discussed.  Regarding climate 24
politics, Cass utilised the three-level game in his analysis of Britain’s climate policy. He argued 
“successive British governments strategically manoeuvred in … a ‘three-level game’ to pursue 
what were perceived to be British national interests” in international climate negotiations.  My 25
analysis will follow in adopting a three-level game framework.

The second problem is that the two-level game is a metaphor for the interactions between 
levels of negotiations rather than an explicit theory about negotiation behaviour. It depicts a 
stylised negotiation between two states to highlight how negotiators must simultaneously pay 
attention to their domestic constituents and other states’ interests. While the two-level game 
outlines general factors that influence a negotiator’s win-set, it provides little guidance about 
what factors may be influential in any given situation. Putnam instead says “[f]ormal analysis of 
any game requires well-defined rules, choices, playoﬀs, players, and information”.  Clearly, the 26
three-level game utilised to analyse EU climate policy needs to have more specific hypotheses. 

One avenue suggested by Putnam for adding suﬃcient analytical teeth to the two-level game 
is to augment it with insights from other IR and policymaking literatures.  Collinson showed 27
this approach works by integrating the two-level game with issue-systems frameworks in her 
work on EU trade policy.  The rest of this chapter will outline what the specific ‘rules of the 28
game' are at the EU and international levels, before explaining why this augmented three-level 
game framework is superior to other frameworks for understanding the EU’s climate 
negotiation behaviour. 

 Sarah Collinson, "'Issue-systems', 'multi-level games' and the analysis of the EU's external 24
commercial and associated policies: a research agenda," Journal of European Public Policy 6, no. 2 
(1999): 217.
 Cass, "The Indispensable Awkward Partner: The United Kingdom in European Climate Policy," 65.25
 Putnam. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.”: 435.26
 Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," 435, 42.27
 Collinson, "'Issue-systems', 'multi-level games' and the analysis of the EU's external commercial and 28
associated policies: a research agenda," 215.
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The rules of UNFCCC negotiations

Negotiators face particular challenges in UNFCCC forums. The UNFCCC requires that “Parties 
shall make every eﬀort to reach agreement on any proposed amendment to the convention by 
consensus” with a three-fourths majority vote used only as “a last resort”.  Backstrand and 29
Elgstrom note that in forums with consensus rules “a ‘reformist’ actor that demands change 
has much less bargaining power than a ‘conservative’, status quo-oriented player”, who 
typically benefits from the status quo and lose less if negotiations fail. 
30
Putnam suggests that “more self-suﬃcient states with smaller win-sets make fewer 
international agreements and drive harder bargains in those that they do make.”  In climate 31
negotiations the better way to conceptualise how ‘self suﬃcient’ an actor is, is to ask how 
much capacity an actor has to mitigate climate change, and how reliant are they on other 
actors making changes. Wurzel, Lieﬀerink and Torney argue “an actor’s relative contribution to 
a particular environmental problem and/or its ability to oﬀer solutions … provide it with 
structural power” in negotiations.  Put more simply, whether a party is a large emitter (in net 32
terms) and whether it has the capacity (capital) to invest in mitigation eﬀorts eﬀects how 
important securing that actor’s cooperation is in negotiations. Backstrand and Elgstrom term 
this ‘issue-specific power’.  These determinants of issue-specific power are the same at the 33
EU and international levels, something that would be insuﬃciently addressed by a framework 
that focused solely on either EU-level or international-level influences on climate agreements. 

Coalitions are also particularly important in climate negotiations. In general, coalitions are 
mechanisms for spreading an actor’s view more widely. This is particularly important for 
 UNFCCC, ‘United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’, Article 15.3. 29
 Bäckstrand and Elgström, "The EU's role in climate change negotiations: from leader to ‘leadiator’," 30
1373.
 Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," 443.31
 Rüdiger K.W. Wurzel, Duncan Lieﬀerink, and Diarmuid Torney, "Pioneers, leaders and followers in 32
multilevel and polycentric climate governance," Environmental Politics 28, no. 1 (2019): 9.
 Bäckstrand and Elgström, "The EU's role in climate change negotiations: from leader to ‘leadiator’," 33
1372.
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ambitious actors in negotiations who need to convince other actors to support their proposal.  34
But additionally at the UNFCCC, because negotiations are often structured around brokering 
deals between a small number of negotiators who represent major groupings of states, failure 
to join a major group could lead to a party’s views being excluded from key negotiations.

Importantly, all of these considerations can be absorbed into the three-level game. They 
constitute the ‘rules’ of the international level of climate negotiations. The three-level game 
does not rule them in or out as influences, it simply says that states will respond rationally to 
considerations of issue-specific power, the voting rules in the UNFCCC, and the heightened 
importance of coalition building. The next section will outline the additional, unique challenges 
the EU faces at the UNFCCC. 

EU actorness 
The EU is party to the UNFCCC as a Regional Economic Integration Organisation (REIO). 
REIOs do not have voting rights.  EU member states, by convention, ratify or reject climate 35
agreements jointly, but there is no guarantee they will into the future. Scholars argue that other 
actors take the EU seriously because it displays a contingent form of ‘actorness’. Groen and 
Niemann define actorness as “the ability to function ‘actively and deliberately in relation to 
other actors in the international system’” in a way broadly comparable to how states engage 
with the international system.  Criteria for actorness vary. Vogler suggests an actor should 36
have ‘autonomy’ (it is seen as a distinct entity, not a vessel for other states), ‘volition’ (the 
 Oberthür and Groen, "Explaining goal achievement in international negotiations: the EU and the Paris 34
Agreement on climate change," 713.
 The EU is the only REIO in existence. Vogler, "Global Climate Politics: Can the EU be an Actor?," 23.35
 Lisanne Groen and Arne Niemann, "The European Union at the Copenhagen climate negotiations: A 36
case of contested EU actorness and eﬀectiveness," International Relations 27, no. 3 (2013): 309.
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intention to act), negotiating capacity, and instruments to change others’ behaviour.  Groen 37
and Niemann add that an actor’s goals and tactics should be coherent. 
38
Actorness is also constructed relationally, that is to say, while the above metrics are important 
factors to consider, they are diﬃcult to assess objectively. Instead, negotiating parties tend to 
form opinions on the legitimacy of an actor based on what they see in negotiations. Vogler 
notes 

“the EU is constructed as an actor in day-to-day accounts of international climate 
negotiations … On occasions the attribution of ‘actorness’ to the Union has gone well 
beyond the strict letter of international law.” 
39
If other actors believe that the EU is responsible for its actions, it matters little whether it is EU 
oﬃcials or member states’ representatives signing oﬀ on actions. They only have to believe 
that when they strike a deal with the EU, the EU will bring its member states with it. 

However, these are shaky foundations for actorness. In order to keep up the illusion, the EU 
has to focus on uniting its member states so they present one coherent message in 
negotiations. This requires time consuming, on-site coordination meetings, which can mean 
“little time and resources are left for outreach to, and negotiations with, their partners (or 
opponents) in the negotiations.”  Moreover, there are significant consequences for the EU’s 40
negotiating ability if it cannot stay united. Other parties can divide the EU, it can make the EU’s 
messages seem incoherent, and it reduces the EU’s credibility. 
41
The important takeaway from the actorness debate is that EU actorness at the international 
level is contingent on preference aggregation at an EU level. Any theory that adequately 
explains what influences EU behaviour at UNFCCC negotiations needs to take these multi-level 
 Vogler, "Global Climate Politics: Can the EU be an Actor?," 20.37
 Groen and Niemann, "The European Union at the Copenhagen climate negotiations: A case of 38
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dynamics and contingencies into account. It must explain how EU preferences are aggregated 
and why member states stick to that agreement. This is where the three-level game functions 
better than other models. It explicitly shows how actions at an international level depend on 
actions at the EU and domestic levels, and vice versa, so can better engage with EU actorness 
in UNFCCC negotiations. 

Formulating EU policy and international negotiating mandates

In order to set out the ‘rules’ of the EU level game, it is worth briefly examining what EU 
institutions are involved in making climate policy, before this chapter demonstrates why EU-
centric theories are insuﬃcient for explaining EU behaviour in climate negotiations. There are 
four main EU policymaking bodies. Firstly, the European Commission (the Commission), which 
roughly corresponds to an EU bureaucracy. Secondly, the European Parliament (the 
Parliament) elected directly by EU citizens. Thirdly, the Council of the EU (the Council), made 
up of ministers from the member states. The Council is the key decision-making body within 
the EU and the direct interface between national governments and the EU.  While there is 42
technically only one Council of the EU, its make up and name changes according to the issue 
being discussed. For climate policy the most important councils are Council of Environment 
Ministers, and the Council of Energy Ministers.  Finally, the European Council, made up of the 43
heads of state or heads of government of the member states. The European Council shapes 
and ‘directs’ EU policy, but does not have legislative power.  
44
Environmental issues are issues of ‘joint competence’ within the EU. This means that EU 
institutions, and member states can both enact environmental policy. This does not, however, 
 Claire Dupont and Sebastian Oberthür, "The Council and the European Council: Stuck on the Road to 42
Transformational Leadership," in The European Union in International Climate Change Politics: Still 
Taking a Lead?, ed. James Connelly, Duncan Lieﬀerink, and Rudiger Wurzel (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 
2017), 66.
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 Rüdiger K.W. Wurzel, Duncan Lieﬀerink, and Maurizio Di Lullo, "The European Council, the Council 44
and the Member States: changing environmental leadership dynamics in the European Union," 
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include energy policy which is the sole competence of member states.  Consequently, the EU 45
can issue directives enforcing environmental standards and create EU-wide initiatives, but 
member states can also create their own policies, such as the UK adopting an emissions 
trading scheme. Joint competency also means the EU is represented in international 
negotiations by the Council President (a role that rotates amongst EU member states on a six-
monthly basis) and the Commission jointly. 
46
When an EU level policy (like the EU’s 2030 Climate and Energy Package) is being developed 
the process begins with the Commission formulating a policy proposal, either of its own 
volition or having been asked to by the Council or European Council. The proposal is 
submitted to the Council and the Parliament under “ordinary legislative procedures”.  This 47
means both bodies must agree to adopt the policy and any amendments to it for it to enter into 
law. The Council votes require a qualified majority of 55% of member states, representing 65% 
of the EU’s population to pass. There are also heightened requirements for a blocking minority 
in Council. “To limit the possibility of larger states joining together to stop proposals, a blocking 
coalition must include at least four Member States representing at least 35% of the EU's 
overall population.”  In general, this makes it hard to veto a climate proposal. However, the 48
Council must decide unanimously on issues of member state sole competence, including 
proposals eﬀecting member states’ energy mixes.  Here a single state can be a veto player. 
49
 Claire Dupont, Sebastian Oberthür, and Katja Biedenkopf, "Climate Change: Adapting to Evolving 45
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Dynamics, ed. Camilla Adelle, Katja Biedenkopf, and Diarmuid Torney (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2018), 109.
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Despite having formal equality between the Parliament and Council in the legislative process, 
the Council has become a significantly more important body for climate policy. The Parliament 
has been constrained by the dynamics within the Council. Eastern member states have 
become more assertive in blocking climate policies, or have only been willing to support 
compromise versions of legislation. Consequently, the Parliament, which is typically regarded 
as a pro-climate actor because of its strong Greens presence, has often had to choose 
between implementing compromise legislation or no legislation, rather than advancing an 
independent, ambitious agenda. 
50
These Council dynamics have also stymied the Commission. The Commission is not a 
legislative body. It cannot force other EU bodies to adopt a proposal. When the Council or 
Parliament are deadlocked the Commission typically becomes more transactional, weakening 
aspects of its proposals in an attempt to secure a compromise, and it has to accept 
compromise agreements negotiated by the European Council (which often has to mediate 
disputes between member states that were unresolvable at a ministerial level). While these 
agreements can undermine key parts of the Commission’s proposal, it is the only way the 
Commission can secure a guaranteed win in highly politicised circumstances.  
51
Additionally the Council is the most important body for developing EU mandates for climate 
negotiations. It develops and ratifies the EU’s negotiating strategy, with input from the 
Commission. This does not require Parliamentary approval. During COPs, the EU convenes on-
site coordination meetings, where member state negotiators (typically ministers or their 
delegates), with the Commission’s assistance, adjust the EU's negotiating stance.  In theory 52
the Parliament should also oversee negotiations, but despite continually asking to be included 
 Charlotte Burns, "The European Parliament and Climate Change: A Constrained Leader?," in The 50
European Union in International Climate Change Politics: Still Taking a Lead?, ed. James Connelly, 
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in EU negotiating meetings for COPs (which it sends delegations to), the Parliament is 
consistently excluded by the Council and Commission.  
53
Given the importance of the Council for both policymaking and negotiation mandate formation, 
the dynamics between and within member states will matter enormously. The three-level game 
is well placed to analyse them in a wholistic way. 

The general limitations of integration theories 
Given the complexity of the EU policymaking process one might ask why not base this thesis 
around EU level theories. The problem with EU-centric theories is that they are predominantly 
theories of integration (with the possible exception of multi-level governance (MLG) which will 
be examined later).  They seek to explain why the EU exists as an entity and why its powers 54
have (or have not) expanded vis-a-vis member states. The integration process is not a concern 
of this thesis. Moreover, EU theories have been generally “criticised for not paying enough 
attention to external [international] factors”. EU theory still broadly treats the EU as a ‘closed 
system’.  It has not developed adequate mechanisms to connect international events and EU 55
decisions. Furthermore EU-centric theories are not designed to explain the EU’s behaviour 
internationally. But even assuming these theories can tell us something about day-to-day EU 
policymaking and international behaviour, this chapter will examine the major theoretical 
schools and show why they are sub-optimal bases for explaining how the EU behaves in 
international climate negotiations. 
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Intergovernmentalism’s shortcomings

Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) is perhaps the dominant theory in EU integration and 
policymaking literature.  It draws heavily from political economy and negotiation theory. 56
Moravcsik, the founding father of LI, described it as having three premises: “the assumption of 
rational state behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation and an 
intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiations.”  It does not treat state preferences as 57
a given but believes they emerge through domestic contestation. LI further suggests the most 
active interests at a domestic level are those that stand the most to lose from any EU level 
agreement. This loss is generally characterised as economic loss.  Moravcsik never explicitly 58
rules out non-economic motivations, however LI has developed into a theory that typically 
portrays a state’s interests as being “shaped by the national conditions that reflect the 
economic interests of the economically dominant national constituents.”  Additionally, these 59
dynamics are replicated in inter-state bargaining. Within the EU the states most actively 
pursuing a deal are those that have the most to gain, while those who are least advantaged by 
it have the least incentive to agree.  LI is not a theory that explains how the EU or its member 60
states bargain with non-EU actors. This is a significant weakness in the framework when 
applied to studies of climate negotiations. 

LI draws heavily from Putnam’s two-level game. Moravcsik concedes that “[f]rom the very 
beginning, much [European Community] decision-making has been diﬃcult to explain except 
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as a two-level game.”  Putnam and Moravcsik both agree about state preferences being 61
contested and identify very similar factors that influence states’ bargaining power in 
international negotiations, including range of possible deal-ratifying coalitions at a domestic 
level, the ability to make side deals, the intensity of interests, and the costs of no-deal.  This 62
raises the question why use the spinoﬀ theory rather than the original if the diﬀerence is so 
marginal? Using LI might be justified if its assumptions about the EU game’s ‘rules’ are better, 
however there are a number of problems with LI’s assumptions.

LI has become somewhat reductionist in its reasoning, assuming that economics are the key 
drivers of substate actors’, and consequently, governments’ actions. Constructivists have 
strongly critiqued this saying that norms and ideational factors impact actors’ behaviour, not 
just economic considerations.  Constructivist critiques also critique LI's rationalist ontology. 63
We will return to constructivist critiques of rationalism shortly, but suﬃce it to say this is a 
problem with LI not rationalism generally. This is evidenced by rationalists noting similar 
problems. International political economy theories “have long recognised that domestic politics 
create[s] incentives for governments to pursue policies that are suboptimal from an economic 
perspective” because politicians’ first duty in democracies is to be responsive to voters, who 
do not always prioritise material interests.  Hiscox suggests voters often balance economic 64
considerations against non-material considerations and even if voters care about economic 
issues, they often have incomplete views of the world so make choices that do not benefit their 
economic interest.  Moreover, economic and foreign policy are complex. Opinion polling data 65
shows that poll responses about complex policy issues vary wildly depending on their 
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phrasing, even if the question’s core meaning stays the same. This suggests that how a policy 
is framed matters more than its objective economic impact.  LI is right to make states a 66
central part of the picture, but is wrong to characterise their motives as being purely economic 
and is limited in only theorising about intra-EU bargaining. 

Multilevel dynamics but not governance 

Supranationalist theories stand in opposition to LI. They suggest that EU institutions are 
‘genuinely autonomous’ of member state actors and can exert independent influence on the 
policymaking process that determines EU policy outcomes.  The supranationalist framework 67
most commonly applied to EU climate policy is MLG. MLG’s core premise is that national 
governments are losing their governance functions to subnational and supranational bodies.  68
Many traditional functions, like the regulation of goods and capital, have been usurped, and 
there are a plethora of new public and private entities with governance functions.  
69
MLG has some strengths compared to other EU-centric theories. For one it is not an 
integration theory, it is a “middle-range … theoretical approach that accounts for the day-to-
day workings of European integration and the EU.”  It is also more attentive to inter-level 70
connections between sub-state actors, EU actors and national governments, and the range of 
directions in which influence can flow. MLG scholars have made some important findings that 
allow us to better understand the ‘rules’ of the EU-level game. Zito highlights the wide range of 
actors that have inputs into the EU policymaking process, suggesting each can act as an 
access or veto point depending on circumstances. Consequently, actors seeking to make 
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changes in the EU often need to build ‘entrepreneurial coalitions’ of actors who occupy 
diﬀerent potential access/veto points, to minimise the chance of action being stymied.  71
Schrueurs and Tiberghien explored how climate policy has benefited from ‘multi-level 
reinforcement’. EU’s climate policy has not been contingent on one ambitious actor but 
instead, at diﬀerent times, has developed through “the actions … of a group of pioneering 
states  … the European Parliament and European Commission”.  Multi-level reinforcement is a 72
key feature of EU policy negotiations. 

However, MLG has a number of significant flaws. MLG scholars acknowledge its hypotheses 
do not hold true across all policy areas. As Pagoulatos and Tsoukalis note: 

“policy areas traditionally branded as ‘high politics’ (foreign policy, economic policy) 
remain the least susceptible to MLG, [instead] subject to a prevailing logic of government 
interest and the dominant role of state and institutional actors … characterised by a 
formal layering of authority and far more limited involvement of non-state actors.” 
73
International climate negotiations, as a foreign policy issue, are subject to this caveat. 
Additionally, because UNFCCC forums only allocate votes to nation-states, for the EU to have 
any power at the UNFCCC it needs its member states, who hold the voting rights, to cooperate 
with it.  Hence states are more important in climate politics than MLG classically depicts. 
74
MLG also typically ‘brackets oﬀ’ international factors.  Schreurs and Tiberghien come close to 75
acknowledging them, saying the EU is both an “arena for member states to negotiate with 
each other and an actor in its own right in international climate negotiations”, but they do little 
to incorporate international dynamics into their theory.  Historically MLG scholars have paid 76
“little attention to the external environment, but the very idea of multi-level entrepreneurship 
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points to the possibility that EU actors may use global arenas” to reshape supranational 
dynamics.  This failure to properly engage with the international level is a significant 77
shortcoming for MLG which the three-level game avoids.

Defending rationalism against constructivist critiques

Constructivism provides a distinctly diﬀerent way to analyse the EU’s climate negotiation 
behaviour. Constructivists reject core assumptions of rationalism. They argue that: 

“the interests of actors cannot be treated as exogenously given or inferred from a 
material structure. Rather, political culture discourse and the ‘social construction’ of 
interest and identities matter.” 
78
The social structures, norms and values around actors regulate their behaviour, but 
simultaneously individual’s interactions with those norms and values determine their meaning.

Constructivists have made significant contributions to debates about why the EU is an 
ambitious climate actor. Grippner, Morseletto, Biermann and Pattberg have discussed how 
keeping global warming below 2℃ above pre-industrial levels became a norm in the EU and 
has come to guide the EU’s internally adopted and externally advocated climate policies.  Van 79
Schaik and Schunz’s argue that the EU is a ‘norm-driven’ actor that has internalised three key 
pro-environmental norms which drive its behaviour: multilateralism, sustainable development, 
and a precautionary principle.  Skovgaard argues the EU’s adoption of a 20% to 30% GHG 80
reduction target in 2009 resulted from EU actors being ‘entrapped’ by previous commitments 
that the EU would be a global leader on climate change, and the precedent of previous strong 
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actions to curtail climate change. Having previously endorsed the norms they were diﬃcult for 
EU actors to argue against without triggering backlash from the public for their hypocrisy.  81
However, he also noted the EU’s lack of influence at Copenhagen discredited arguments about 
EU leadership on global climate change and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) made some EU 
leaders less receptive to compromising economic benefits for climate action. 
82
There are a number of responses to constructivist critiques of rationalism. Firstly, taking a 
rationalist stance does not necessarily mean ignoring how norms and other ideational factors 
influence actors’ behaviours. Risse argues “soft rationalist” approaches, with an expanded 
definition of what actors should rationally respond to, can adequately incorporate norms and 
values.  Dai also argues that constructivist insights can be reconciled with a rationalist 83
decision making calculus. She notes rationalism “only presupposes that actors pursue their 
goals in an instrumentally rationalist way, regardless of whether these goals are defined in 
terms of material interests.” She goes on to say “the desire of society - materialistic or 
idealistic - is consequential for governmental policymaking.”  If voters value norm-driven 84
environmental policy because they have internalised those beliefs, it is rational for a 
government to follow through on those policy expectations so as to stay in power. Under this 
conception it would be rational for governments to develop policies in line with the 2℃ 
warming limit if that goal was widely supported in the electorate. 

The second response is that, even if we accept that it is not a given actors will behave 
rationally, they may have been socialised into that behaviour. Johnston argues that 
constructivists could explain the dominance of realpolitik behaviour in international diplomacy 
as the result of ‘socialisation’ into that mode of thinking.  A similar argument could be made 85
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about the culture of climate negotiations in the EU and internationally being one that favours 
rationalist behaviour. At that point to explain the result of climate negotiations you should still 
adopt a rationalist framework, even if that mode of thinking may not be the dominant approach 
forever. This demonstrates that either the three-level game will be able to take on board 
constructivist insights about non-material influences on negotiations and combine them into a 
rationalist framework eﬀectively or, due to socialism, rationalism is the dominant frame for 
negotiators and thus the three-level game is an appropriate theory for analysing their actions. 

Conclusion 
The three-level game is the best lens through which to understand the EU’s behaviour in 
climate negotiations. EU-centric theories fail to deal properly with the international dimensions 
of negotiations. IR theories need to be supplemented by proper analysis of the EU level to 
show how decisions are made and EU actorness is achieved. The three-level game corrects for 
these flaws. This chapter has shown the three-level game can be eﬀectively operationalised, 
and has detailed the ‘rules of the game’ at the EU and international levels, drawing on insights 
from IR and policymaking literature, which strengthens the three-level metaphor. This chapter 
has shown that LI’s focus on economic incentives as the drivers of negotiating tactics is 
problematic. Similarly MLG’s claims about states losing powers are empirically untrue in 
climate negotiations. Moreover, both under appreciate the international elements of climate 
negotiations. Finally, constructivist critiques about rationalism do not hold. Either their insights 
about non-material drivers of action can be incorporated into a rationalist framework, or the 
negotiators’ rationalist ethic can be explained as a result of socialisation. Neither degrade the 
three-level games’ analytical worth.
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3. The EU’s 2030 Climate Targets 
This chapter analyses the EU-level negotiations over the bloc’s 2030 GHG emissions reduction, 
renewable energy, and energy eﬃciency targets. The GHG emissions reduction target went on 
to become the EU’s INDC  for COP21. The INDCs detailed the initial GHG emissions 86
reductions parties would commit to make at COP21, independent of the agreement 
negotiations. This chapter aims to show two things, firstly how the EU’s targets were agreed 
and secondly that the three level game is the best theory for analysing their developments. It 
begins by outlining what the EU’s 2030 targets were compared to the Commission’s preferred 
targets. It then tracks the development of Germany, the UK, France and Poland’s preferred 
targets in turn. The chapter next analyses how these four member states’ concerns were 
addressed through a compromise agreement comprised of three sub-compromises: a deal 
between the Western member states on what the targets would be; a side payment to minimise 
costs for Poland; and finally an ambiguous review clause that provides governments with a 
way to claim their views had been respected in negotiations. The conclusion reiterates why the 
three-level game is the most appropriate framework for analysing this process. 

Background 

In October 2014, the EU adopted an ‘at least 40%’ GHG reduction target, legally binding on all 
member states, a 27% target for renewable energy legally binding on the EU as a whole but 
not individual member states, and a 27% non-binding energy eﬃciency target all by 2030.  87
These closely reflected the targets the Commission had advocated in its initial proposal for the 
2030 climate and energy targets in January 2014 (the only diﬀerence was that the Commission 
advocated a flat 40% GHG reduction target, not ‘at least 40%’). However, this continuity does 
not reflect the significant bargaining that ensued between states as they tried to strengthen 
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and weaken various targets. The preferred targets of Germany, the UK, France and Poland are 
outlined in Table 1. 

Table 1: Preferred targets of EU member states before October 2014 Environment Council meeting

Sources: Carbonbrief, Euractiv 
88
Germany 
Germany has historically been one of the strongest advocates for climate action in the EU. It 
has had a strong green movement since the 1970s and Green party representation in federal 
parliament since the 1980s.  Germany shouldered approximately 75% of the EU’s GHG 89
reductions under the Kyoto Protocol and helped keep the EU’s GHG reduction on track by 
overachieving its targets.  It was able to do this because of incidental emissions reductions 90
Member States GHG Target Renewables Target Eﬃciency Target Explicitly 
Threatening Veto
UK >40% None, but prepared 
to compromise on 
an EU-wide target
None, but prepared 
to compromise on 
a non-binding 
target
No
Germany >40% 30% binding on 
member states
>30% No
France 40% but could 
compromise 
upwards
27% EU binding 30% EU binding No
Poland <40% None None Yes
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after the collapse of East German industries.  By the 2000s all major German parties accepted 91
climate change as a serious problem and supported Germany being ambitious in order to keep 
global warming below 2℃. After the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, Germany’s renewable 
energy targets were raised to 35% by 2020 and 80-95% by 2050 in order to encourage 
renewable energy generation that could replace nuclear generators. This energised the 
Energiewende, a long term project for improving energy security and eﬃciency, and creating 
new jobs through a transition to renewable energies. 
92
There are three main reasons Germany supported an ‘at least 40%’ GHG reduction cut, a 30% 
renewable energy target binding on member states, and a greater than 30% energy eﬃciency 
improvement target: there was a political consensus supporting the targets, they benefited the 
growing German ‘CleanTech’ sector, and Germany wanted to raise ambitions ahead of COP21. 
As noted above there was political consensus that Germany needed to take action on climate 
change. This minimised contrarian debate about the eﬃciency of renewable energy or the 
eﬀectiveness of the targets. Moreover a 55% GHG reduction target for 2030 and a 35% 
renewable energy target for 2020 were already legislated, meaning the costs of increasing 
renewable energy generation and cutting GHG emissions were already priced in by business 
and the general public.  This limited the political backlash against the targets. 
93
Germany’s world leading ‘CleanTech’ sector further explains why it backed ambitious 2030 
targets. The sector grew massively after Germany raised its renewable energy targets in 2011. 
By 2013, the German CleanTech sector was worth about €344 billion, contributed 13% of 
Germany GDP and had a global marketshare of about 14%.  The sector’s growth had two 94
impacts.

Firstly, Germany’s high proportion of renewable energy (making up 28% of Germany’s energy 
production in 2014) made GHG emissions cuts more achievable than in other parts of Europe, 
 Jänicke, "Germany: Innovation and Climate Leadership," 116, 25.91
 Eckersley, "National identities, international roles and the legitimation of climate leadership: Germany 92
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therefore Germany had less incentives to fight the targets.  Secondly, Germany would also 95
have substantially benefited from imposing renewable energy targets on the rest of the EU. 
German CleanTech would be in greater demand across the EU, generating profit for an industry 
that employs over 848,000 people.  Notwithstanding the additional government revenue the 96
sector’s growth would have brought, this is a large proportion of the population who would 
support imposing renewable energy and energy eﬃciency targets, and which a rational 
government would look to appease by supporting strong renewable energy targets. 

Finally, German leaders explicitly linked setting ambitious 2030 targets in the EU with 
influencing the positions of other countries ahead of COP21. That argument was made by 
German Environment State Secretary Jochen Flasbarth who said:

“the German government was pushing to see the EU commit to adequate climate 
protection targets and thus provide an important impetus to the climate negotiations.”  
97
German Environment Minister Barbara Hendricks was even more specific, arguing in April 2014 
that:

“At an international level it is important that we use this year to pave the way for a 
binding post-2020 agreement. Europe must play a leading role in this process. This is 
why we want to set an EU-wide climate target of at least 40 percent by 2030 as quickly 
as possible”. 
98
These statements show that German leaders were cognisant that the decisions they made at 
the EU level would eﬀect the international level of climate negotiations. This interaction of 
negotiation levels is something uniquely explained by the three-level game. 
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The UK 
The UK advocated a GHG reduction target of ‘at least 40%’, possibly rising to as high as 50% 
in the event of a deal at COP21.  This was the most ambitious GHG reduction target in the 99
negotiations. However, the governing Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition could never 
support domestically-binding renewable energy or energy eﬃciency targets because of 
domestic political pressures.

The UK’s ambitious GHG reduction target position was the result of three main factors: the 
emergence of a ‘competitive consensus’ around climate change in the UK from around 2005 
previous political commitments (including under the UK Climate Change Act (2008)), and a 
desire to influence the outcome of COP21. From around 2005 the three major UK parties, 
Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, competed to be the most 
environmentally-friendly party creating a dynamic Carter describes as a ‘competitive 
consensus’.  While Labour and the Liberal Democrats had some track record on 100
environmental issues, the Conservatives’ stance was instigated by David Cameron as part of a 
larger strategy to ‘modernise’ the Conservative Party and win back younger voters and those 
with more liberal social leanings. Importantly, the shifting views of the Conservative opposition 
changed the calculus of the business sector. Businesses started cooperating with the 
government because there was no reasonable chance climate change would disappear from 
the political agenda in the near future, even if the Conservatives were elected in 2010.  They 101
showed what Rayner and Jordan termed a “willingness to be led” on climate issues that 
continued through the early 2010s. 
102
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The 2010 General Election delivered a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government, 
which Cameron promised would be the “greenest government ever”.  Both parties had made 103
climate change central to their revitalised images and the Liberal Democrats’ presence in the 
Coalition was expected push UK climate policy in a more ambitious direction. The Coalition’s 
program for government promised they would “push the EU to demonstrate leadership on 
tackling international climate change”.  They also promised to “work towards an ambitious 104
global climate deal that will limit emissions” and increase climate finance.  The Coalition’s 105
firm commitments on climate change meant that they had to back aggressive climate action 
during high profile policy debates, like the 2030 Climate and Energy Package. Supporting an 
‘at least 40%’ GHG reduction target fitted well within a narrative about UK leadership within the 
EU and support for aggressive climate action. Furthermore the UK Climate Change Act, had 
set a legally binding target of 80% GHG reductions by 2050.  Not meeting that, or being seen 106
to reject proposals that were in line with the Act would have led to political backlash. It was 
rational for the Coalition to back an ‘at least 40%’ GHG reduction target in light of these 
previous targets and predictable potential backlash. 

UK leaders also saw the EU making ambitious GHG emission reductions as a way to energise 
global climate negotiations. They believed if the EU took action it would encourage others to 
follow, thus rearranging the position of actors at the international level. The statements of 
Cameron and Climate and Energy Secretary Ed Davey (a Liberal Democrat) illustrate this 
motivation. Davey argued:

“Getting a good ambitious deal is vital for climate change policy in this country and 
across Europe, … It is vital for the 2015 [global] talks. … If Europe doesn't take that 
 James Randerson, "Cameron: I want coalition to be the 'greenest government ever'," Guardian, 15 103
May 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/may/14/cameron-wants-greenest-
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ambitious position, the chances of getting the Americans, the Chinese and others to 
commit or put forward plans … just won't happen.” 
107
Cameron echoed similar sentiments saying: 

“We know from Copenhagen that we are not just going to turn up in Paris and reach a 
deal. We need to work hard now to raise the level of ambition”.  
108
Critically, however, the UK did not see the mechanism for GHG reductions as important for 
signalling ambition.

There are two main reasons the UK government did not support renewable energy targets 
binding on member states. The first was because of the UK’s energy mix. By 2014 the UK was 
not on target to reach its 2020 EU target for renewable energy, and was investing in nuclear 
energy and shale gas.  The UK may have struggled to reach a higher, binding target, and the 109
target may have undermined the UK’s investments in other energy sources. 

The second reason was political. Cameron was under pressure from UKIP and Eurosceptic 
backbenchers to push back against what they perceived as EU interference in UK domestic 
aﬀairs. This pressure was especially acute leading into the 2014 EU and 2015 general 
elections. EU targets legally requiring member states to change their energy mix were seen as 
infringements on UK ‘sovereignty’ and allowing the country to be dictated to by Brussels.  110
That made the targets politically untenable. Additionally, this political context meant the UK 
government would probably benefit from ‘playing hardball’ with Brussels in the negotiations. It 
was rational for the UK government to push back on renewable energy targets in negotiations 
so as to marginalise those political attacks.
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France 
France’s performance on international climate action has fluctuated somewhat. It has 
alternated between “bandwagoning at an EU level, resistance to specific policy goals and 
instruments, and occasional bids for leadership at the EU and international level.”  The 2030 111
climate and energy package negotiations and COP21 were among France's high profile bids 
for leadership. France’s position on the 2030 targets cut a middle ground between the UK and 
Germany. It supported a 40% GHG reduction target, opposed nationally binding renewables 
targets but not a EU-level target of 27%, and supported a stronger 30% energy eﬃciency 
target binding at an EU level.  This can be explained as the result of a desire to propel 112
international action before COP21, mixed with domestic economic conditions that were not 
particularly favourable for renewable energy generation. 

France was in a fairly good position to achieve GHG emissions reductions. France’s primary 
energy source was nuclear, which has a low carbon intensity. In 2014 nuclear energy 
accounted for over 80% of France’s primary energy production.  France like the UK, it was 113
also not on track to meet its 2020 renewable energy targets and it had poor energy 
eﬃciency.  While EU imposition of targets was less politicised than in the UK, these 114
conditions nevertheless did not encourage France to strongly advocate for renewable energy 
or energy eﬃciency targets that were nationally binding. 

The most influential reason why France looked to secure an ambitious 2030 energy package 
was its hosting of COP21. Bocquillon and Evrard argue that “since 2007, climate change [had] 
 Pierre Bocquillon and Aurélien Evrard, "French Climate Diplomacy: Diplomacy in the Service of 111
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become a prestige issue for the French government and a key area to demonstrate the 
country’s environmental credentials and international standing”.  Domestic attention on 115
climate change, and COP21 specifically, increased in France leading up to 2015.  The 116
success or failure of the conference would also have major impacts on France’s international 
reputation. For France’s President Francois Hollande, COP21 was a particularly high stakes 
personal opportunity. It was “an opportunity for the Socialist government to ‘green’ its 
discourse after a series of environmental policy failures” and a “landmark” in Hollande’s 
presidency.  This context meant that firstly France wanted an ambitious COP21 agreement, 117
and as noted above, the EU agreeing to ambitious GHG emissions cuts was seen as a way to 
raise global ambitions. Secondly, it would have been deeply embarrassing for France, as the 
host of the conference, if its negotiating bloc (the EU) came to COP21 with an unambitious 
target. But it would have been even more embarrassing if it had no target. Consequently, 
France had an incentive to bargain for an ambitious target but also had the most to lose in the 
event of negotiations failing. This, combined with France’s nuclear dependency and poor 
energy eﬃciency policies, meant France was unlikely to reject compromise deals that 
weakened the renewable energy and energy eﬃciency targets. It had a very broad win-set 
going into EU negotiations. 

Poland 
Poland’s position on the EU’s 2030 targets bore little similarity to Germany, the UK or France’s 
positions. It advocated for a below 40% GHG reduction target, and no targets for energy 
eﬃciency or renewables, ostensibly because it believed that EU regulations would aﬀect 
 Bocquillon and Evrard, "French Climate Diplomacy: Diplomacy in the Service of Symbolic 115
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Poland’s economic competitiveness.  The 2030 target negotiations was just one in a series of 118
negotiations where Poland took unambitious stances. Poland had become a veto player in EU 
climate politics. In 2007 Poland built a coalition in the Council centred around the Visegrad 
countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) to water down the 2020 Climate 
and Energy Package.  Poland went on to criticise the EU’s negotiating stance for 119
Copenhagen in 2009 and in 2012 vetoed the ‘2050 Low Carbon Roadmap’ proposed by the 
Commission. It was the only state to veto it. 
120
There were four main reasons Poland’s preferred targets were so unambitious: Poland’s 
economic structures were not favourable for any of the targets, it saw protecting coal as a 
security issue, it was concerned about the eﬀects of the targets on Polish industrial 
competitiveness, and the immediate political context meant there was heightened scrutiny on 
the Polish prime minister making it harder to compromise with Brussels. Poland saw climate 
change as an economic issue rather than a threat in its own right.  This disadvantage pro-121
climate actors because the defining feature of Poland’s economy was its coal dependence. In 
2014, approximately 76% of Poland’s energy production came from coal. It was also a net 
exporter of coal, an unusual characteristic within the EU.  The coal industry provided close to 122
100,000 jobs in Poland. Those workers were a highly unionised and politically mobilised voter 
group, which made taking action against the coal industry politically risky.  Additionally, four 123
of the five largest hard coal mining companies were state controlled and there were close ties 
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between the fossil fuel industry and Polish politicians.  This gave the politicians a direct stake 124
in the success of the coal industry, and coal supporters strong capacity to lobby the 
government. Consequently, Polish politicians almost universally condemned the EU’s climate 
policies, which were framed as ‘costly impositions’ on Poland. Political parties clashed over 
who had given in to Brussels the most, and regular citizens, who showed less concern for 
climate change than citizens in other EU countries, did not reward politicians for action on 
climate change.  Consequently, it would be politically and economically costly for Polish 125
politicians to endorse GHG reduction and renewable energy generation targets of any 
significance.

Coal’s importance to Poland went well beyond economic considerations. Poland and other 
Eastern European states were concerned about energy security and depended on imports from 
Russia to secure their energy market.  Coal was the most abundant domestically available 126
source of energy and using it was the best way to overcome their import dependency. In this 
context, policies that jeopardised Polish coal also jeopardised Polish security. 

Poland was further influenced to lobby against the 2030 targets by economy-wide 
consideration of competitiveness. Poland and other Eastern member states believed Western 
member states had not acted in the spirit of solidarity they were required to.  While Western 127
states viewed exporting climate regulations as ‘levelling the playing field’, as Gawlikowska-Fyk 
notes: 
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“since the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are lower in GDP, they fear that 
stringent environment and climate measures may hamper economic growth, delaying the 
process of catching up with more developed EU economies.” 
128
Poland’s concerns about competitiveness also influenced how it believed the EU should 
engage with the international climate regime. Poland never pledged to be a climate action 
leader.  It instead believed that EU positions should be generated in response to what the 129
international norm was, to avoid any competitive disadvantage. Consequently, arguments 
about influencing COP21 made little sense in Poland. 

Finally, the immediate political conditions in Poland did not create a situation conducive to 
Poland oﬀering major compromises in EU negotiations. There was heightened media attention 
on the new Polish Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz because it was her first major European 
negotiation.  She had promised to “not accept increases in the costs of energy in Poland and 130
the impacts to the economy [sic]”.  Any failure to keep that promise would have incurred 131
political backlash. These domestic constraints meant Poland’s win-set was highly restricted 
entering into EU negotiations, and meant it was particularly diﬃcult to get Poland to support 
any formulation of the targets remotely resembling what Western member states wanted 
without significant compensation. 

A compromise full of sub-compromises 
The eventual 2030 targets agreement was made up of a number of compromises. The first was 
a compromise between ambitious member states setting out what the three targets would be. 
 Gawlikowska-Fyk, "Poland: Coping with the Challenges of Decarbonization and Diversification," 207. 128
 Tim Boersma and Stacy D. VanDeveer, ‘World on Fire: Coal Politics and Responsibility Among Great 129
Powers’, paper prepared for the International Studies Association meetings in Toronto, March 2019, p. 
14. 
 Severin Fischer, The EU's new energy and climate policy framework for 2030: implications for the 130
German energy transition (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für 
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit., 2014), 2. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-412097.
 Henry Foy, "Poland on course for battle on new EU climate change targets," Financial Times, 1 131
October 2014, https://www.ft.com/content/4ec9373c-495e-11e4-8d68-00144feab7de.
	  43
This section will show why the GHG target ended up being towards the more ambitious end of 
proposed targets and why the renewable energy and energy eﬃciency targets were watered 
down, explaining these in relation to both the negotiating parties’ win-sets and the international 
game member states were attempting to influence. The second compromise was a large side 
payment that secured Polish cooperation when it was skeptical of the deal outright. The third 
compromise was the insertion of a ‘review’ clause that provided the ambiguity necessary for 
governments to present the deal domestically as a ‘win’. 

Western states’ target compromise  
The EU’s GHG reduction target ended up being the most ambitious target on the table; an ‘at 
least 40%’ reduction as advocated for by the UK and Germany. This target can be explained 
with reference to how the UK, France and Germany wanted the EU to be viewed internationally 
and how the target would impact the international negotiations. At the UNFCCC the only part 
of parties’ INDC that would be directly comparable would be their respective GHG emission 
reductions because the INDCs allowed each party to determine how they would make their 
reductions. Consequently, the most important part of the EU’s submission for spurring 
international action and showing it was an ambitious actor by international standards, was the 
GHG reduction target.

In addition to those considerations, the ‘at least 40%’ wording added some ambiguity to the 
proposal. It allowed states that only wanted to make a 40% reduction, like France, to only 
make a 40% reduction, while other, more ambitious states could take greater action and claim 
that was endorsed by the EU agreement. 

The EU’s agreed 27% renewable energy target binding only at an EU level and 27% non-
binding energy eﬃciency target were closer to the UK’s targets than most other EU players’ 
preferences. The three-level game can provide three explanations for this which centre on 
features of the EU-level game: the UK had a much smaller win-set than other member states, it 
had more issue-specific power, and its negotiating tactics were better. The UK’s win-set was 
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restricted because of the political implications of binding member states renewable energy 
targets and its economic structures, as outlined above. Germany’s win-set, however, was more 
flexible than it initially appeared. There was a sense in which EU-wide targets for renewables 
and energy eﬃciency could be seen as a signal that would drive purchasing of German 
CleanTech, albeit a more limited signal than Germany would have liked. By contrast, there was 
no way that binding member-state level targets could be seen as the UK pushing back against 
Brussels’ increasing power over UK aﬀairs. France’s domestic political and economic 
dynamics did not encourage it to advocate strongly for higher renewable energy or energy 
eﬃciency targets, and additionally the proposed compromise roughly aligned with its preferred 
position. This could explain why the EU moved closer to the UK’s preferred agreement. 

The UK had a lot of issue-specific power relating to climate policy, and the EU needed its 
goodwill going forward so may have been prepared to compromise on the structure of the 
deal. Issue specific power in climate politics, as defined in chapter 2, is the power a state has 
to mitigate climate change. The UK had one of the largest EU economies and had taken on 
and achieved large emissions reductions in previous burden-sharing agreements (agreements 
amongst EU member states about what GHG reductions each state would make). The UK 
would be crucial for meeting the EU’s 40% GHG reduction. This likely influenced EU leaders 
when they made concessions to the UK. This view seems to be endorsed in the statement of 
Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb, who told the Guardian: 

“The UK will be needed for brokering a deal on burden-sharing as they have a big vested 
interest here. We need all the big muscles we can get to solve this and the UK brokering 
a deal would be warmly welcomed.” 
132
The UK invested a lot of diplomatic energy into shaping the EU’s 2030 targets. In 2010, the UK 
founded the ‘Green Growth Group’, a loose coalition of states that collaborated to “make EU 
climate policy more ambitious and sustainable.”  The Group’s members have included (at 133
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various times) Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK and Norway.  It has gone 134
on to be an influential grouping in EU climate politics. The largest growing divide in EU climate 
policy today is between the Green Growth Group members and Eastern member states.  
135
Davey credited the Green Growth Group for the compromise 2030 targets in an interview with 
Euractiv, suggesting “what the UK achieved by setting up the Green Growth Group shows that 
you can reform the EU from within.”  Moving the negotiation venue from the Council to one 136
initiated and controlled by the UK may have allowed it to steer the compromise towards 
positions it preferred. It is also notable that the Green Growth Group statement of 3rd March 
2014 articulates two of the three elements of the compromise deal, ‘at least 40%’ GHG 
emissions reductions targets and a 27% renewable energy target binding at an EU level only, 
months before they were adopted.  
137
A side payment for Poland 
The second sub-compromise was a deal with Poland. Poland’s demands were well outside 
anything the UK, France and Germany would consider, but Poland was also threatening to veto 
the proposal, which would have been disadvantageous for the Western member states.  The 138
key to bringing Poland on board was a ‘side payment’. Poland’s opposition to GHG reductions 
was not based on ideology but, as outlined above, an economic calculation. What Poland 
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wanted from the EU was assistance to prevent energy price increases.  The final agreement 139
saw developing EU countries receive free ETS permits for their power sector, up to a cap of 
40% of permits. Poland stood to gain the most from this provision. It would receive up to 200 
million emissions credits, valued at about €4 billion if carbon was priced at €30 per tonne.  It 140
also gained access to a new fund to modernise its energy sector financed from 2% of ETS 
allowances. This was increased from the Commission’s preferred 1%.  This allowed Kopacz 141
to argue she had ‘won’ in Brussels by securing massive compensation for the targets. “I said 
that we will not return from this summit with new [financial] burdens, and indeed there are no 
new burdens,” she told reporters after the negotiations. 
142
The review clause

The final sub-compromise was a review clause inserted into the final agreement stating that the 
EU would revisit the targets after COP21. The clause was ambiguously worded, such that 
Poland believed the clause would ensure the EU’s ambition could be scaled back if the Paris 
Agreement was unambitious, thus safeguarding EU competitiveness, while the UK claimed the 
40% GHG reduction target could only be scaled up.  Member states could portray this 143
clause diﬀerently domestically to buttress their own claims they had achieved the ‘right’ 
outcome at the summit, and consequently save face. 
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Conclusion 
Scholars need to appreciate all three levels of the climate negotiations game to understand 
how the EU reached is 2030 targets. The above analysis has shown that inter-state bargaining 
is a key part of the story. This might have been predicted by LI, but the three-level game serves 
to better analyse it for a number of reasons. Firstly, it can explain intergovernmental bargaining 
more eﬀectively than LI. Not only has it shown that win-sets are a good framework for analysis 
but additionally the three-level game framework isolates the relevant influences on negotiations 
better than LI because it considers the factors IR scholars have shown to be key determinants 
of climate negotiation outcomes: negotiation tactics and the issue-specific power of states. 
Secondly, the three-level game broadens the explanations for states’ win-sets beyond 
economic considerations to encompass how politicians seek to appease voters' desires more 
generally. This can include intangible considerations, like support for the COP21 process and 
concerns about the EU eroding British sovereignty. These are crucial for explaining the 
negotiations’ outcomes, but are ignored by LI. Thirdly, the three-level game adds greater 
analytical rigger by considering how the international level eﬀects EU states’ behaviours. 
Desire to influence international negotiations was a key reason the UK, France and Germany 
adopted more ambitious positions on GHG reduction targets. Moreover, the rules of the 
international game help explain why the EU’s GHG reduction target was more ambitious than 
its renewable energy or energy eﬃciency targets. These insights are only provided by the three 
level game.
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4. The EU’s COP21 Negotiating Mandate 
While the previous chapter detailed the negotiations over the EU’s GHG reduction commitment 
for COP21, this chapter analyses the EU’s negotiating mandate for COP21. This mandate set 
out the EU’s preferred architecture for the Paris Agreement. The chapter particularly focuses on 
how the EU wanted the Paris Agreement to be structured and what global mitigation eﬀorts the 
EU favoured. These were articulated in the Commission’s communication The Paris Protocol – 
A blueprint for tackling global climate change beyond 2020 released in February 2015, and 
endorsed at the September 2015 Environment Council meeting.  This chapter is structured 144
around explaining four of the EU’s key negotiating demands:

1) A ‘below 2℃’ limit on warming 

2) A legally binding agreement

3) The inclusion of strong measurement, reporting and verification rules, particularly a five-
yearly review cycle 

4) GHG emission reductions by developing countries 

It also considers two key omissions from the EU’s negotiating mandate:

1) References to historical responsibility

2) References to decarbonisation 

It argues that these inclusions and omissions can only be explained by considering all three 
levels of the three-level climate negotiations game. 

The 2℃ limit 
A 2℃ limit on global temperature rises was central to the EU’s negotiating position at COP21 
and one of the least controversial elements of the EU’s platform. The target dates back to Yale 
 European Commission. The Paris Protocol – A blueprint for tackling global climate change beyond 144
2020 COM(2015) 81 final. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:e27fdb4d-bdce-11e4-
bbe1-01aa75ed71a1.0003.03/DOC_1&format=PDF>. accessed 5 August 2019. 

Council of the European Union. Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3409th Council Meeting, Environment. 
PRESSE 54. 18 September 2015. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23000/st12166en15.pdf>. 
accessed 4 August 2019. 
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University studies from the 1970s and was adopted by the EU in the 1990s, prior to the Kyoto 
negotiations. It has been central to EU policy planning and climate diplomacy ever since.  145
Constructivists have highlighted the 2℃ target as a norm that has been internalised by the EU, 
and consequently appears in policy statements. The three-level game can provide two 
alternate explanations for the target’s position in the negotiation mandate. Firstly, it would not 
dispute that the target had widespread support in the EU and was eﬀective at mobilising a 
wide range of scientists, policymakers and activists behind the EU’s climate policy goals, as 
Morseletto, Biermann and Pattberg have argued.  However, the three-level game would 146
suggest that, at the point that the norm had such widespread support, EU governments 
needed to include the target to mobilise those groups behind the EU’s new position. That is a 
rational calculation. Secondly, including the 2℃ target is also related to how the EU wanted to 
position itself in the international negotiations. Including a scientific-based target showed the 
EU took climate science seriously, something demanded by many of the Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS) countries and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and gave the EU 
significant moral power in the negotiations.  It was an avenue through which the EU could 147
legitimise its demands. Hence the 2℃ target can be explained by considerations at the EU and 
international levels. 

A legally binding agreement 
Legally binding international agreements have been controversial in international climate 
negotiations because of the strict requirements they place on states. The EU has generally 
been in favour of the legally binding environmental agreements since the UNFCCC’s 
foundation. In the lead up to COP21 EU member states, including all the Visegrad countries 
who were usually the most critical of EU environmental policy, were on the record as 
 Gippner, "The 2°C target: a European norm enters the international stage—following the process to 145
adoption in China," 55-62.
 Morseletto, Biermann, and Battberg, "Governing by targets: reductio ad unum and evolution of the 146
two-degree climate target," 667.
 Van Schaik and Schunz, "Explaining EU Activism and Impact in Global Climate Politics: Is the Union a 147
Norm- or Interest-Driven Actor?," 174-75.
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supporting a legally binding agreement.  Constructivist scholars attribute this support to the 148
EU’s history. The EU is an institution where member states ‘pool sovereignty’ in order to 
achieve desirable outcomes. Member states have become comfortable with ceding control and 
enforcement powers to supranational bodies and believe international law is a mechanism to 
solve international problems.  This natural acceptance of international law was articulated by 149
EU leaders when discussing the architecture of the Paris Agreement. French Foreign Minister 
Laurent Fabius said it was “obvious” that the Paris Agreement would have legally binding 
elements.  The EU’s Director General Climate Action Jos Delbeke told the Oxford Martin 150
School: 

“As a European it is hard to understand why the United States is so emotional about an 
international treaty … For a European it’s hard to understand [US opposition] while we 
are having an EU, where we are giving powers to the EU [sic]”. 
151
The three-level game would not ignore these considerations. Undoubtably the EU does have 
more sympathy for international law than many other actors. However, the EU’s advocacy for a 
legally binding agreement has to be seen in broader context. Member states had made 
statements supporting an ambitious deal. Failure to secure adequate checks and balances 
within the deal would have provoked backlash from NGOs and other pro-climate actors. 
Legally binding provisions should be seen as the ultimate assurance for pro-climate actors that 
any COP21 agreement would help curb climate change. In that context, the EU could not avoid 
advocating for an internationally binding agreement. 

 Robyn Eckersley, "Who’s Afraid of a Climate Treaty?," in Who’s Afraid of International Law?, ed. 148
Raimond Gaita and Gerry Simpson (Clayton: Monash University Publishing, 2017), 98.

Visegrad Prime Ministers and President of France. Press Statement on the Occasion of the Summit of V4 
Prime Ministers and the President of the French Republic. Visegrad Group. 19 June 2015. <http://
www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2015/press-statement-on-the>. accessed 22 August 2019. 
 Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," Journal of Common Market 149
Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 240-41.

Helene Sjursen, "The EU as a ‘Normative’ Power: How Can This Be?," Journal of European Public Policy 
12, no. 2 (2006): 242, 45.

Van Schaik and Schunz, "Explaining EU Activism and Impact in Global Climate Politics: Is the Union a 
Norm- or Interest-Driven Actor?," 173.

Eckersley, "Who’s Afraid of a Climate Treaty?," 98-99.
  Arthur Neslen and Damian Carrington, "Paris climate deal must be legally binding, EU tells John 150
Kerry," Guardian (London), 13 November 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/nov/12/
paris-climate-deal-must-be-legally-binding-eu-tells-john-kerry.
 Jos Delbeke, EU climate policy – where are we headed? Presentation to the Oxford Martin School, 3 151
November 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZE-c-XBeZIY>, 12 September 2019. 
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International factors also prompted the EU to advocate for a legally binding agreement. One 
might suggest the US’ well known opposition to legally binding agreements would make the 
EU reticent to make this demand. However, as will be examined more fully in chapter five, the 
EU had made significant eﬀorts to engage with the US. Delbeke explained that the EU was 
“looking at ways to have [the Paris Agreement be] legally binding without forcing the US … to 
go through the Senate” for ratification.  Moreover, even if the US was to reject a legally 152
binding agreement, this kept pressure on the US to justify its position and come up with 
genuine alternatives, and pushed them closer to the strong agreement the EU wanted. Cañete 
alluded to this saying  “[i]t is no secret that the USA and a number of countries are reluctant to 
agree to some form of binding deal. It’s up to these countries to demonstrate a convincing 
alternative”.  Hence, while the EU’s advocacy of legally binding agreements was influenced 153
by its history, it was also a rational calculation based on pressure at a member state level and a 
desire to push the international negotiations towards the most eﬀective deal possible. 

Measurement, reporting and verification provisions  
There were two components of the EU’s negotiating mandate that aimed to strengthen the 
measurement, reporting and verification requirements for countries’ GHG emissions cuts. 
Firstly, the EU wanted a comprehensive rulebook for measuring GHG reductions developed 
that would apply to all countries, and secondly they wanted there to be five yearly reviews of 
global commitments, where states would have to present evidence of their actions and be 
encouraged to make more ambitious commitments in a way that was more ‘dynamic’ than a 
fixed emission reduction pledge. The Council conclusions make it clear that the pledges made 
by states should, at every review point, be equal to or more ambitious than previous 
submissions and keep the world on track to meet the 2℃ target.  
154
 Delbeke, EU climate policy – where are we headed? Presentation to the Oxford Martin School.152
 Gerorgi Gotev, "EU anxious ahead of COP21 conference," Euractiv, 21 August 2015 2015, https://153
www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/eu-anxious-ahead-of-cop21-conference/.
 Council of the European Union. Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3409th Council Meeting, 154
Environment. PRESSE 54.
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These provisions were designed to balance two considerations. The first was pressure from 
member states that were concerned the flexibility inherent in the Paris Agreement would 
hamper eﬀorts to curb GHG emissions.  The UK government argued that:
155
“Our experience with pledges put forward in Copenhagen has clearly highlighted the 
need for rules, as it has been extremely challenging to understand the true level of 
ambition of commitments and the rate of delivery because of the lack of a common and 
clear framework to track progress.”   
156
Germany was also particularly concerned to ensure the agreement was suﬃciently strong to 
inspire action. Merkel told the Petersburg Climate Dialogue: “[w]e can all more easily face the 
challenge posed by climate change if we can have confidence that our international partners 
pursue the same goal”.  Similar views were articulated by EU oﬃcials who wanted to ensure 157
the agreement was “about actions rather than words”.  This coalesced into a broad push for 158
strong accountability measures within the COP21 agreement. 

The second consideration was the international dynamics. While as noted above the EU was 
optimistic countries would accept some form of legally binding agreement, they also had to be 
pragmatic in their negotiating stance. COP21 was not going to enshrine fully binding Kyoto-
style reduction targets because the US and BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and 
China) would not support it.  Delbeke talked about trying to “rethink” the international climate 159
regime, and “land [somewhere] between a pure top down and pure bottom up” arrangement.  160
The best way to achieve this was to advocate a strict rulebook and review process, which had 
some support beyond the EU. Notably, just weeks after the Council approved the EU’s 
 Aline Robert and Frederic Simon, "COP 21 national contributions behind schedule, France warns," 155
Euractiv 2015, https://www.euractiv.com/section/sustainable-dev/news/cop-21-national-contributions-
behind-schedule-france-warns/.
 HM Government, Paris 2015: Securing Our Property Through a Global Climate Change Agreement, 156
London: HM Government, 2014, p. 55. 
 Euractiv and AFP, "Merkel and Hollande push for ‘ambitious’ climate deal," Euractiv, 20 May 2015 157
2015, https://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-environment/news/merkel-and-hollande-push-for-
ambitious-climate-deal/.
 Gotev, "EU anxious ahead of COP21 conference."158
 Parker, Karlsson, and Hjerpe, "Assessing the European Union’s global climate change leadership: 159
from Copenhagen to the Paris Agreement," 247-48.
 Delbeke, EU climate policy – where are we headed? Presentation to the Oxford Martin School160
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negotiating mandate, France managed to secure Chinese support for the review mechanism.  161
The three-level game can show how the EU’s negotiating position attempts to balance this 
European push for ‘top down’, strict provisions against the international push for ‘bottom up’, 
looser requirements.

Ultimately, the EU gave up on agreeing the exact accountability and transparency rules at 
COP21, deferring it to later COPs. It was the one element of the negotiating mandate jettisoned 
before the summit. This decision was likely driven by desires to avoid overloading the 
negotiation agenda. But Oberthur and Groen also characterise the decision as part of a longer 
term strategy to ‘downscale’ EU ambition and ensure it was not locked out of negotiations for 
making demands unreasonable to other parties.  At all points the EU was attentive to what 162
eﬀect advocating a given position would have on negotiations.

GHG reductions by developing countries

The responsibilities developing countries would have under the Paris Agreement was one of 
the most contested elements of the international negotiations because it required interpreting 
the “common but diﬀerentiated responsibilities” (CBDR) clause in the UNFCCC which is 
supposed to guide the allocations of burdens to curb climate change. The EU’s position was 
that all states should make mitigation eﬀorts, but those eﬀorts should be diﬀerent based on 
states’ “diﬀerent national circumstances and evolving economic realities and capabilities”.  163
This had been its position since the Durban COP (2011), when it made its commitment to a 
second Kyoto reduction period conditional on all major emitters (including high-emitting 
 Tom Phillips, "China and France say Paris climate pact should have five-year reviews," Guardian, 3 161
November 2015 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/nov/02/china-and-france-say-
paris-climate-pact-should-have-5-year-reviews.
 Oberthür and Groen, "Explaining goal achievement in international negotiations: the EU and the Paris 162
Agreement on climate change.", p. 719
 Council of the European Union. Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3409th Council Meeting, 163
Environment. PRESSE 54.

René Audet, "Climate justice and bargaining coalitions: a discourse analysis," International 
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 13, no. 3 (2013): 381.
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developing countries) agreeing to work towards a universal deal on climate change.  164
The EU’s public justification for the stance rested on international-level considerations. The UK 
argued “even if the EU and US … reduced their emissions to zero we would not achieve the 
below 2℃ goal”.  The EU was additionally under domestic political pressure not to 'let large 165
emitters oﬀ the hook’. There was a public perception that the two track system was ‘unfair’.  166
Delbeke noted that China’s per capita emissions were similar to the EU’s and suggest that 
while there was: 

“some margin of manoeuvre for those [countries] with a very low level of greenhouse gas 
emissions per head, … after a certain while this question [of developing countries’ 
emission reductions] needs to be addressed.”  
167
Economic considerations had also become much more important for the EU since the GFC, 
particularly in Eastern European states.  They argued that undertaking costly emissions 168
reductions programs would put the EU at a competitive disadvantage if developing countries 
did not make emissions cuts. Poland, and President Duda particularly, made this argument 
vocally, at one point threatening to veto the Paris deal if it did not protect European and Polish 
competitiveness.  Consequently, the EU had to advocate for significant emissions cuts from 169
emerging economies. 
 Carl Death, "A predictable disaster for the climate–but who else won and lost in Durban at COP17?," 164
Environmental Politics 21, no. 6 (2012): 982.

Bäckstrand and Elgström, "The EU's role in climate change negotiations: from leader to ‘leadiator’," 
1377.
 HM Government, Paris 2015: Securing Our Property Through a Global Climate Change Agreement, p. 165
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The three-level game provides the most compelling analysis of why the EU wanted all countries 
to make GHG emissions reductions. While LI would have expected EU member states to be 
concerned about their economic competitiveness, it would not have seen the international 
dimensions to this concern because, as noted in chapter two, it only theorises about intra-EU 
bargaining. Scholars need the third level to contextualise competitiveness considerations and 
understand the relevance of the concerns about emerging economies’ emissions. Additionally 
LI would have underplayed how public opinion in some member states, particularly the UK, 
was against the Kyoto-style diﬀerentiation. Given this eﬀects how voters view the legitimacy of 
their governments’ arguments, they are important considerations in the climate negotiation 
process. The next two sections will discuss the key omissions from the negotiation mandate.

Historical responsibility

The concept of historical responsibility for climate change is notable by its absence from EU 
documents. It appears in UK documents, but is dismissed summarily as something that “will 
not solve the problem” of formulating GHG reduction burdens.  The omission of references to 170
historical responsibility can be explained by both member state level and international level 
factors. At the international level its inclusion would have put the EU at a negotiating 
disadvantage by conceding the principle to the BASIC countries.  Climate Analytics 171
estimates the EU is responsible for 17% of cumulative GHG emissions, almost as much as 
China (12%) and India (6%) combined.  Making historical responsibility an issue at COP21 172
would have led to the EU negotiating position being discredited. 

 HM Government, Paris 2015: Securing Our Property Through a Global Climate Change Agreement, p. 170
51.
 Audet, "Climate justice and bargaining coalitions: a discourse analysis," 379.171
 Marcia Rocha et al., Historical Responsibility for Climate Change – from countries emissions to 172
contribution to temperature increase (Climate Analytics, 2015), 8, https://climateanalytics.org/
publications/2015/historical-responsibility-for-climate-change-from-countries-emissions-to-contribution-
to-temperature-increase/.
	  56
At a member state level the EU’s largest historical emitters, the UK, France and Germany, were 
three of the most powerful countries in the EU.  They had no incentive to put historical 173
responsibility on the agenda. Moreover, Eastern European countries, who were in credit from 
their Kyoto reductions, and had low historic emissions than Western Europe, could negotiate 
lower GHG reduction targets during EU burden sharing negotiations.  They would have 174
gained little political capital for future negotiations within the EU by pushing historic 
responsibility onto the agenda. 

Decarbonisation and long term targets 
Decarbonisation objectives and long term GHG reduction targets were the most controversial 
elements of the EU’s mandate in Council negotiations. Just months previously the UK, France, 
Germany and Italy had signed onto a G7 statement where they committed to “decarbonise the 
global economy in the course of this century”.  However, Poland backed by Eastern member 175
states opposed the Commission’s target for reducing global GHG emissions and references to 
decarbonisation.  The EU ultimately made two compromises. Firstly, it replaced the 60% 176
reduction oﬀ a 2010 baseline with a 50% reduction oﬀ a 1990 baseline.  Secondly, it omitted 177
the goal of ‘decarbonisation’ of the global economy in favour of achieving ‘climate 
neutrality’.  This section will firstly explain Polish opposition to decarbonisation and the 178
global target. It will then explain why the EU compromised with Poland. 

 Rocha et al., Historical Responsibility for Climate Change – from countries emissions to contribution 173
to temperature increase, 8.
 Adamczewski, Poland’s Approach to the Paris COP.174
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Poland’s opposition can be explained by its political and economic environment. As explained 
in chapter three, Poland relies on coal fired power and is a large coal exporter. Decarbonisation 
was seen as meaning the end of the coal sector, which was politically and economically 
untenable for the Polish government. Additionally, the pressure on the Polish government was 
particularly acute because the Environment Council meeting, where these proposals were 
being debated, took place in the middle of the Polish election campaign. The opposition Law 
and Justice Party had been campaigning on saving the coal industry and criticising EU 
environmental laws.  The Civic Platform-led government could not be seen to be abandoning 179
the coal industry, a highly unionised and politically mobilised voter group, by supporting 
decarbonisation. Instead climate neutrality, in Poland’s opinion, allowed it to continue burning 
and exporting coal, as long as it was oﬀset by Carbon Storage Capture technology or forest 
planting.  Notably, Poland did not object outright to the structure of the negotiating mandate, 180
only the provisions that would have prevented its continued use of coal.

The initial, and somewhat puzzling, thing to note about the EU brokering a compromise with 
Poland is that the EU could have enforced a qualified majority vote on the Council decision and 
outvoted Poland, but it choose not to. This decision corresponds with Kliene’s contention that 
EU decisions are guided by ‘informal governance’ rules. She argues, drawing on constructivist 
insights, that there is a strong norm within the Council that favours unanimity unless it 
absolutely cannot be reached.  However, the three-level game can better explain the EU’s 181
reticence to use qualified majority voting. Firstly, the costs of compromise were fairly low for 
other EU leaders in this case. The EU could portray the compromises as “irrelevant but face-
saving” changes to wordings designed to help the Polish government during its election 
 Barbara Lewis, "Polish elections complicate EU quest for Paris climate stance," Reuters, 18 179
September 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/climatechange-eu/polish-elections-complicate-eu-
quest-for-paris-climate-stance-idUSL5N11N2L920150917.
 Adamczewski, Poland’s Approach to the Paris COP.
180
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campaign that did not damage the EU’s climate credentials.  Secondly, Poland had much 182
stronger bargaining power than is predicted by EU-centric theories, like LI or MLG. Not 
reaching a unanimous agreement would have shown that the EU was divided going into 
COP21 and harmed its negotiating ability.  For the EU to eﬀectively negotiate and articulate a 183
message at COP21 it needed all its member states to be seen as being on the same page, 
especially because each EU member state had its own delegation to the UNFCCC and the EU 
could not force them to vote in any particularly way. Visible disunity was a much greater 
potential harm for ambitious EU member states than embarrassment over decarbonisation’s 
exclusion from the EU statement, so the member states compromised. The impact of EU unity 
on negotiations will be discussed further in chapter five.

Conclusion

There were many considerations that informed the diﬀerent aspects of the EU’s negotiating 
mandate for COP21. As table 2 shows there were national, supranational and international 
factors all at work, sometimes concurrently. The three-level game can best explain how all 
these factors fit together. EU-centric theories only focus on the supranational level, or at best 
include some analysis of the member state level. This is insuﬃcient to explain the EU’s 
negotiating mandate and gives an incomplete picture of why some states, like Poland, had so 
much bargaining power in EU negotiations. Moreover, even where constructivist theories have 
previously provided the greatest insights, like around the endorsement of a 2℃ warming limit 
and why the EU did not use qualified majority voting to outvote Poland, the three-level game 
can provide rational explanations for how these decisions came about. Chapter five will outline 
how eﬀective the EU was at achieving the goals set out in its negotiation mandate at COP21, 
and show how the various decisions made in negotiations about its INDC (chapter three) and 
negotiating mandate (this chapter) influenced the EU’s performance at COP21. 
 Kalina Oroschakoﬀ, "EU climate goals set to clash with US aims," Politico, 19 September 2015 2015, 182
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Table 2: Considerations influencing the EU negotiating mandate

Source: Author’s compilation 
Position National  consideration
Supranational 
consideration
International 
consideration
2℃ warming target
Important for bringing 
civil society on board 
across the EU
Legally binding 
provisions
Domestic pressure for a 
strong COP21 deal
Favourable view of 
international law
Measurement, 
reporting and 
verification
Domestic pressure for a 
strong COP21 deal
Accountability 
provisions were a more 
widely supported back-
up if legally binding 
provisions weakened
Rulebook negotiations 
jettisoned because 
COP21 agenda was 
overloaded
GHG reductions by 
developing countries
Poland concerned 
about competitiveness
The size of emerging 
economy emissions
Historic responsibility
France, Germany and 
the UK are large historic 
emitters
Eastern European 
states could be 
compensated in EU 
burden-sharing 
agreements rather than 
the UNFCCC
Would have weakened 
the EU’s negotiating 
position
Decarbonisation and 
long term targets
Polish election 
campaign
Poland had significant 
leverage
Visible disunity would 
have hurt the EU’s 
negotiating credibility at 
COP21
	  60
5. The EU at COP21 
This chapter examines why the EU was able to be an influential actor at the COP21 in Paris. 
COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009 was widely regarded as a disaster for EU climate diplomacy. It 
was variously described as ‘a disappointment’, ‘frustration’ and ‘political humiliation’ by EU 
oﬃcials.  The Commission and EU Presidency were sidelined by the end of COP15, as a deal 184
was struck between 25 major emitters outside the UNFCCC plenary process.  By contrast, 185
the Paris Agreement strongly reflected the EU’s preferences. It was a legally binding, universal 
agreement, with strong accountability and transparency measures including a five-yearly 
stocktake of global emissions.  It also incorporated the EU’s preferred below 2℃ limit for 186
long term global warming, while also referencing making “eﬀorts to limit the temperature 
increase to 1.5℃ above pre-industrial levels”.  This chapter argues that the EU’s 187
performance at COP21 is best explained by examining its careful manoeuvring at all three 
levels of the climate negotiations game. It begins by considering the impact of the international 
environment on the EU’s negotiating ability. It then discusses the EU’s climate diplomacy 
program and the two key benefits that came from it: additional information about negotiating 
parties and a strong international negotiating coalition. Finally the chapter looks at how the EU 
was able to maintain unity among member states and why it could compromise eﬀectively in 
negotiations. 
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International environment 
COP15 was a challenging environment for the EU to negotiate in. The EU’s GHG emissions 
were declining, so its position was less important for future climate agreements compared to 
the BASIC countries and the US. Its global economic influence was also dented by the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC). This meant the EU had less ability to compel major emitters like China 
and the US to adopt its positions. The US and BASIC countries were simultaneously under 
strong domestic pressure to prioritise economic competitiveness over taking climate action, 
especially in the context of increased attention to economic performance during the GFC.  188
Developing countries were determined to pursue rapid economic development, while 
simultaneously becoming more important veto players in climate negotiations.  This created a 189
much less favourable set of circumstances for the EU than previous climate negotiations. 

The international environment leading into COP21 was altogether diﬀerent. The conference 
took place under significantly better social, economic and political conditions.  There was 190
rising concern about climate change across Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. The 
Obama administration were more receptive to a climate agreement.  Moreover, the failure of 191
Copenhagen had energised diplomats both in the EU and beyond to try and make COP21 a 
success. Euractiv reported negotiators saying Paris was an “anti-Copenhagen”.  There was a 192
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perception that, as one delegate put it to the IISD, “there [was] just too much at stake to fail” at 
Paris. 
193
In Putnam’s terms, international fear of climate change and more stable global economic 
conditions almost universally weakened ‘isolationist’ forces and strengthened ‘internationalist’ 
forces globally. This had three important impacts. Firstly, it meant any state that attempted to 
block the deal would have likely incurred significant domestic political costs, additional to any 
international reputational damage they would have incurred.  Secondly, it eﬀectively shifted 194
the range of politically acceptable oﬀers states could make at COP21 towards the more 
ambitious end of the spectrum. This does not mean there were no unambitious states, but that 
broadly states were inclined towards more than a lowest common denominator deal. This was 
important for a reformist actor like the EU because it reduced the distance between its 
minimum requirements and compromise options nearer to the lowest common denominator, 
making the EU’s proposals seem more reasonable and minimising losses for the EU if it did 
eventually have to compromise. Thirdly, stronger internationalist forces lowered the costs for 
unambitious actors of compromising for a deal, because there was a general acceptance that 
pursuing a deal was, in itself, important.  This was advantageous for actors pushing 195
moderately ambitious agendas, like the EU, because it became less costly domestically for 
unambitious states to agree to stricter terms. 

Climate diplomacy 
Climate diplomacy is an essential element for success in international negotiations, especially 
for ambitious actors. It allows states to understand what positions are and are not acceptable 
to other actors, meaning states can target their contributions such that they are not likely to be 
completely discarded by other negotiating parties. It is also important for building alliances 
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prior to the conference, which are necessary for gaining negotiating leverage and, in the case 
of ambitious actors, important for allowing ideas to spread more widely. The EU did not invest 
enough time in climate diplomacy prior to COP15 to achieve any of these benefits.  
196
By contrast, an expansive climate diplomacy program was central to the EU’s strategy for 
COP21. The EU’s diplomatic assets were mobilised to an unprecedented extent and highly 
eﬀectively in the lead up to COP21.  The EU ‘Action Plan for Climate Diplomacy’ in 2015 197
noted:

“Having the world's largest diplomatic network … the EU has collectively enormous 
foreign policy capacity and must mobilise this network based on political will to secure its 
objectives.” 
198
The EU identified over 40 events where climate diplomacy could be undertaken in 2015 alone 
and member states followed up, placing climate change on the agendas of major diplomatic 
events.  Many diplomatic eﬀorts were organised by the EU’s Green Diplomacy Network, a 199
grouping that brought together representatives of member states’ diplomatic services to 
coordinate climate diplomacy. Where the EU did not have a major presence in a country the 
UK, Germany, and to a lesser extent France, became coordination points for EU climate 
diplomacy, with their embassy staﬀ supporting EU staﬀ in meetings.  This meant the EU 200
could reach out to an enormous number of stakeholders.  The French negotiating team, 
independently in their capacity as COP21 President, travelled the world conducting bilateral 
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meetings with China, South Africa, and India among others.  This ensured climate change 201
was at the front of world leaders’ minds.

IR theories have been fairly adept at explaining the impact climate diplomacy can have on 
international negotiations. However, they provide little insights about how the EU managed to 
mobilise its diplomatic forces eﬀectively. MLG would say climate diplomacy benefited from the 
‘multi-level reinforcement’ that Schreurs and Tibergherian noted was a central feature of EU 
environmental policymaking.  Climate diplomacy was constantly placed on the EU’s agenda 202
in the lead up to COP21 by diﬀerent actors. The Commission and European External Action 
Service (EEAS) issued reflection papers in 2011 and 2013 which argued for a “further step-up 
[of] eﬀorts on climate diplomacy to address climate change at all political levels and to 
strengthen the EU voice and activities internationally”, and nurturing a “strategic alliance for 
ambition” among other proposals.  France also pushed climate policy onto the agenda of the 203
March 2015 European Council meeting. However, the three-level game can provide a more 
complete explanation than MLG. The reason France introduced climate diplomacy onto the 
European Council agenda was that it wanted other EU member states to “prod the late-comers 
[those states who had not submitted their INDCs] into action.”  A French source told Euractiv 204
“[s]ome European countries have close contacts with countries we are interested in. We hope 
to mobilise all the diplomatic forces we can”.  This is best explained as a manoeuvre within a 205
three-level game. By altering the arrangement of actors at the EU level (prodding them to 
undertake climate diplomacy), France sought to make EU member states change the positions 
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of non-EU states at the international level. France made a move at the EU level to reshape the 
international level. This is the core insight of the three-level game. 

There were two important results of the EU’s climate diplomacy eﬀort: an understanding of 
what policies would be acceptable to other countries, and an alliance termed the ‘High 
Ambition Coalition’ (HAC). They were crucial to the EU’s eﬀectiveness at COP21, and will be 
analysed in the next two sections. 

Testing the waters on climate compromises

The EU’s consistent struggle in global climate politics has been to push for “the most 
ambitious margin within the realms of the realistically possible agreements”.  If the EU’s 206
“position is feasible at the international level and if the preference distance between the EU 
and the negotiation partners is not too large” they can deliver ambitious climate agreements.  207
The diﬃculty comes in working out at what distance from other actors’ aims compromise is 
achievable. In Copenhagen the EU’s aims were “too ambitious to be reconcilable with the 
interests of the United States and BASIC countries” and their negotiating strategy did not 
suﬃciently account for other negotiating parties’ conservatism.  This left the EU isolated. It 208
was determined not to make the same mistake in Paris. 

Climate diplomacy helped the EU to gain a wholistic understanding about other parties’ 
domestic politics, and how states’ climate policy sat within their broader social, political, and 
economic contexts.  This then gave the EU a better understanding of the true limits of other 209
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states’ win-sets, and helped the EU ascertain how ambitious it could make its goals while not 
antagonising other negotiating parties by advocating ‘unacceptable’ positions. This was 
important for securing a legally binding climate agreement. The legal form of the agreement 
depended on the US, whose Republican-controlled Senate refused to ratify a climate treaty or 
protocol.  The EU was consistently in dialogue with the US, testing a large number of 210
possible legal configurations for the agreement to gauge how much the US could actually 
compromise, and how much of their rhetoric was simply leveraging the threat of Congress 
rejecting the deal to gain a negotiating advantage.  Delbeke described the strategy in 211
October 2015 saying:

“between legally binding and not legally binding there is a grey zone, and it has to do 
with compliance … we are now teasing out the ground of that grey zone in pushing the 
US as far as possible with coming on board, but at the same time not pushing them 
overboard that the Senate would turn the treaty down. [sic]” 
212
Hence the EU could go to Paris not backing down on its legally binding agreement demand, 
despite a general consensus in the public sphere that the US would reject anything remotely 
legally binding. 
The High Ambition Coalition  
Actors that are advocating ambitious positions in international negotiations have to work hard 
to get their views accepted by the international community. The key method their views can 
reach broad acceptance is through building coalitions.  At Copenhagen the EU alienated 213
potential coalition partners from developing countries by “abandoning” the Kyoto Protocol’s 
two track approach. It was also too preoccupied with internal coordination to reach out 
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eﬀectively to other parties.  Leading into Paris, the EU invested significant energy in building 214
coalitions. The most important coalition it helped found was the HAC. 

Cañete described the HAC as “the masterplan of Europe and its allies”.  It was a group of 215
likeminded developed and developing countries who argued for an ambitious climate 
agreement at Paris. It operated informally and secretively through most of COP21.  Its 216
members included a mix of Latin American, Caribbean, African and Pacific countries, alongside 
the EU and Norway.  The EU and Norway began co-convening meetings of progressive 217
countries from 2011, with the Marshall Islands taking over convening duties after May 2015.  218
The group met on the sidelines of the major climate forums throughout 2015, and the EU also 
recruited for the HAC during meetings with Pacific Island leaders and at its INDC facilitation 
forum in Rabat.  
219
The HAC was important for advancing the EU’s objectives in several ways. Firstly, the HAC 
acted as forum through which the EU could disseminate its preferred policy positions. HAC 
members, including the EU, were formatting their negotiating positions concurrently. This 
meant that the EU could push other members to adopt policies it preferred, and it could 
absorb ambitious ideas that had support internationally. By December 2015 the HAC’s aims 
had crystallised around agreeing on a legally binding agreement that included five-yearly 
reviews of NDCs, a clear long term trajectory for climate mitigation centring on ‘deep cuts’ by 
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214
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2050, and limiting global warming to 1.5℃, all ideas that originated from, or were agreeable to, 
the EU.  
220
Secondly, HAC members coordinated positions in the lead up to, and supported each other’s 
statements throughout COP21. This minimised the chance the EU would be advocating for 
unpopular positions or would be locked out of the main COP21 discussions. 
221
Thirdly, it gave the EU’s policies an extra veneer of legitimacy because they were being 
articulated by the Marshall Islands, a ‘moral superpower’ in climate negotiations.  The HAC’s 222
developing country members could attack the positions of large emitters in ways the EU could 
not. Fourthly, and most importantly, the HAC fundamentally undermined the arguments of 
China, India and other major developing emitters who argued developing countries should be 
excluded from undertaking significant mitigation measures, or be subject to diﬀerent 
transparency provisions. Brun argues that 

“[t]hese developing countries could no longer hide behind poorer developing countries 
with little capacity, because many of the most vulnerable countries had become vocal 
champions of high ambition.”  
223
The HAC gathered enormous momentum in the final days of the conference. When the HAC 
made its existence known publicly on 10 December, it had over 100 members, including the 
US (who had joined that day) and all 28 EU member states.  It also peeled oﬀ Brazil from the 224
BASIC group the following day.  The HAC’s public reveal radically changed the dynamics of 225
COP21. The IISD reported that it “created a show of solidarity that some said eﬀectively 
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220
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marginalised those not in the group.”  It became so large that it made opposition extremely 226
costly. This inverted the typical dynamics of the COP, whereby it was easier for unambitious 
states to justify their positions domestically, to one where they had to move, hence countries 
like Australia piled into the HAC. In the process, the EU’s preferred policies became the 
orthodoxy. The HAC was ultimately secured the inclusion of key demands in the final 
agreement, notably legally binding provisions, a 1.5℃ target and five-yearly reviews. 
227
While IR literature can tell us why the HAC was important for the negotiations, the three-level 
game can extend those insights and show how the EU’s ability to join the HAC was contingent 
on EU level decisions. Chapters three and four showed how the EU was able to agree an 
ambitious INDC and negotiating mandate. This built the EU’s credibility with developing 
countries, particularly those that saw climate as an existential threat. The EU would not have 
had the political capital to convince African and Pacific Island states to join the HAC, or to 
reach out to the Marshall Islands, if the EU’s INDC and negotiating stance had not positioned it 
among the most ambitious actors at COP21. 

Maintaining EU unity  
While not the sole explanation of the EU’s goal achievement at COP21, internal unity 
“facilitates external eﬀectiveness” for the EU in international negotiations.  As noted in 228
chapter 2, the EU has no voting power at the UNFCCC. In order for the EU to matter as an 
entity, its member states need to work together. If the EU appears divided its message 
becomes incoherent and other actors can attempt to pit member states against each other, 
stopping the EU from agreeing any further negotiating positions. The EU was noticeably 
divided at COP15. Public high-profile disputes about the EU’s 2020 Climate and Energy 
package, and public disagreements at the December 2009 European Council meeting over 
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whether the EU should oﬀer to reduce its GHG emissions by 30% by 2020 made the EU 
appear divided at Copenhagen.  This weakened the EU's eﬀectiveness as an actor.  The EU 229 230
was keen to avoid that mistake at Paris.

The most diﬃcult member state to keep in line was likely to be Poland. The October 2015 
Polish elections had removed the Civic Platform-led government and replaced them with the 
Law and Justice Party, whose MPs had called for the government to veto the Paris Agreement. 
President Duda also showed a willingness to veto international climate agreements, vetoing the 
Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol.  However, days prior to the conference beginning, 231
the Polish environment minister announced that his government would be part of the 
negotiations and would not act to block an agreement.  
232
The Polish government’s decision to cooperate in COP21 negotiations can be attributed to EU-
level factors. EU oﬃcials had concluded deals with the previous government (see chapters 
three and four) and used them to leverage the new government into cooperating. Cañete 
emphasised publicly that the EU:

“had an agreement in the European Council … and Poland was on board with that 
agreement. We [have] approved our INDC, [which] Poland also supported … and we have 
a mandate of negotiation which Poland was very active in shaping … I understand that 
we will be able to negotiate in Paris under the negotiation mandate and that Poland will 
be on board.” 
233
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Cañete portrayed the policies as locked in after they cleared Council, making it diﬃcult for the 
Polish government to argue against them. This tactic also had important ramifications for 
Polish domestic politics. As Putnam argues, constraints at the international level can help 
governments rearrange domestic actors.  By claiming their hands were tied by the EU, the 234
Polish government had a viable excuse for ignoring pleas to tear up the Paris Agreement, thus 
saving their domestic reputation. 

The EU managed to maintain unity throughout COP21 by sticking closely to its negotiating 
mandate. Notably, the EU continually advocated for the inclusion of ‘carbon neutrality’ in the 
agreement text rather than ‘decarbonisation’, despite strong pressure to change its stance. The 
change was reportedly discussed and vetoed by Poland in coordination meetings because of 
the impact decarbonisation entailed for the Polish mining and energy sectors.  EU 235
coordination meetings are eﬀectively a release valve for domestic pressures. They allow the EU 
to ensure it is accomodating the domestic politics of its member states, so they do not break 
ranks and undermine the EU. The result was that EU negotiators were clear throughout. Cañete 
told reporters “[w]e have had a mandate from member states to underline a path to carbon 
neutrality, not decarbonisation.”  This level of unity ensured “all 28 member states spoke with 236
one voice throughout negotiations” and consequently made the EU’s diplomacy as targeted as 
possible.  In this case, the EU’s minimalistic win-set regarding decarbonisation and strong 237
internal constraints forced other countries to adapt their policies. Decarbonisation was 
excluded from the final agreement text.  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Adjusting negotiating positions  
The corollary of the EU’s extensive coordination procedures is that the processes can become 
rigid and cumbersome. Any significant change to the EU’s negotiating position needs to be 
agreed in coordination meetings. Consequently, Delreux argues “the EU often has diﬃculties in 
reacting quickly to proposals by third countries, showing flexibility and strategically prioritising 
issues in the endgame of negotiations”.  This became a problem for the EU at COP15. When 238
major emitters refused to compromise with the EU:

“[t]here was no plan B included in the EU negotiating strategy, which would have allowed 
the EU to react to the negotiating realities and stay more closely involved in the process 
of arriving at some sort of compromise agreement”. 
239
The EU coordination process failed to agree an alternate negotiating mandate and 
consequently EU negotiators had no ability to compromise with other states. 

During COP21 the EU agreed to shift its position on a long-term global warming limit from 2℃ 
to 1.5℃.  This decision contrasts to the EU’s inflexibility over decarbonisation, another target 240
that entails a quicker, and more costly transition to a low carbon global economy. While it is 
hard to know what was said in the EU coordination meeting to change member states’ views, 
the three-level game can provide three explanations for the change. 

At the domestic level, the 1.5℃ target was less politically controversial for Poland. Poland did 
not tend to object to general climate actions, like strict accountability provisions, legally 
binding agreements or the 2℃ target. It objected to measures where the costs were born 
squarely by industries that are significant domestic political players. Hence it could not agree 
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to decarbonisation, which has very specific impacts for the coal industry, but could agree to a 
1.5℃ target because that requires emissions to be reduced generally.

At the EU level Poland also had a mechanism to lessen the burdens of the 1.5℃ target. The 
burdens on Poland could be reduced through EU eﬀort sharing arrangements. Hence, even if 
there were domestic burdens, they could be significantly ameliorated.  

Finally, at the international level, compromising on the 1.5℃ limit was more important for the 
EU’s overall negotiating strategy. The target was the top demand of AOSIS, LDCs, some 
African countries, and crucially the HAC.  Christoﬀ suggests adopting the target helped 241
weaken developing countries’ insistence that they accept liability for damage to developing 
countries caused by historic emissions from the West, a demand the EU and most developed 
countries were keen to rebuﬀ.  However, equally importantly, failing to adopt the 1.5℃ limit 242
would have harmed the EU’s relationship with the HAC, cutting the EU oﬀ from its path to 
getting its policies adopted.  Furthermore two EU member states (Germany and the UK) were 243
founding members of the coalition.  Rebuking the group’s demand would have embarrassed 244
its own member states, or worse cause them to speak out, undermining EU unity. Those were 
never acceptable propositions.

Conclusion

The EU performed vastly better at Paris than at Copenhagen. To understand why, we need to 
consider all three levels of the climate negotiations game. Table 3 shows that the key choices 
the EU made at COP21 cannot be explained by any one level of analysis. The international 
environment influenced the range of deals acceptable domestically in non-EU countries, 
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241
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pushing them closer to the EU’s position. The EU’s climate diplomacy was eﬀective at Paris 
and allowed it to negotiate more successfully. The three-level game can show that the climate 
diplomacy push came about because of EU factors. France’s actions in lobbying other member 
states to step up their climate diplomacy shows EU member states knew how various levels of 
climate politics are connected. Moving players at the EU level could help reposition players at 
the international level. The EU’s ability to reach out eﬀectively to the HAC was dependent on 
ambitious EU-level agreements. The EU’s unified appearance relied on reaching agreements 
between member states and being acutely aware of the domestic-level constraints member 
states faced. The compromises the EU made in international negotiations were similarly 
influenced by domestic constraints, but we should add they were also influenced by 
international-level considerations about how important compromising was for delivering an 
international agreement. All of this shows that explaining the EU’s behaviour in international 
climate negotiations involves considering more than LI’s EU-centric intergovernmental 
bargaining. It also involves more complicated international inputs than MLG appreciates. The 
three-level game is the only model dynamic enough to explain the EU’s behaviour.

Table 3: EU decisions at COP21

Source: Author’s compilation

EU decision National-level factor Supranational-level 
factor
International-level 
factor
Undertaking climate 
diplomacy
France and the 
Commission pushed 
EU member states to 
undertake climate 
diplomacy
EU wanted to 
reposition international 
actors
Joining the HAC EU had credibility from 
its ambitious INDC and 
negotiating mandate
EU sticking to its 
negotiating mandate Political limitations on member states were 
respected
EU negotiating 
mandate was already 
agreed and followed 
closely
EU compromising on 
1.5℃ target
1.5℃ did not impact 
politically important 
industries in Poland as 
much as 
decarbonisation.
Compromising on 
1.5℃ was important 
for concluding an 
international 
agreement
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6. Conclusion 
This chapter returns to the question posed at the start of the thesis: what influenced the EU’s 
behaviour at COP21. It begins by summarising the findings of this research. It then highlights 
the thesis’ academic contribution and presents avenues for future research.

Research findings 
What influenced the EU’s behaviour at COP21? The short answer is that there were a range of 
national, supranational and international factors at play. This thesis has shown that the three-
level game is the best way to identify those factors and explain why they mattered to the 
domestic, EU and international negotiations process. 

Table 4 provides a full summary of key decisions the EU made in the COP21 pre-negotiations 
and negotiations processes and what factors (national, supranational, international) were at 
play. However, in order to illustrate the findings of this thesis further, the next three sections 
provide a brief recap of decisions made at each level of negotiations leading to COP21 and 
shows how they are interrelated. 
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Table 4: Influences on EU climate policy

Source: Author’s compilation

National level

Domestic political and economic considerations influenced the positions member states took 
at EU and international negotiations but were not the sole influence. Germany’s support for 
strong renewable energy targets was driven by economic considerations, while the UK position 
on renewable energy targets was influenced by its energy mix and political debate about EU 
incursions on UK sovereignty. Poland’s opposition to decarbonisation was triggered by its large 
and political active coal industry. However, governments were additionally influenced by the 
EU decision National-level factor Supranational-level 
factor
International-level 
factor
40% GHG reduction 
target binding on 
member states
X X
27% EU-wide renewable 
energy target X
27% non-binding energy 
eﬃciency target X
2℃ warming limit X
Legally binding deal X X
Strict measurement, 
reporting and 
verification rules
X X
GHG reductions by 
developing countries X X
No historic responsibility X X X
No decarbonisation X X X
Undertaking climate 
diplomacy X X
Joining the HAC X
EU sticking to its 
negotiating mandate X X
EU compromising on 
1.5℃ target X X
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international factors. The UK, France and Germany advocated for an ambitious INDC and 
negotiating mandate to try and influence the COP21 outcomes. 

Supranational level

At the Council and European Council the relative power and domestic constraints of member 
states influenced negotiation outcomes, and consequently the positions the EU took to the 
UNFCCC. The UK was important for EU burden sharing agreements, so it was accommodated 
in negotiations over the renewable energy and energy eﬃciency targets. Poland won massive 
concessions in negotiations because of its domestic constraints. Adding the international level 
to the analysis helps explain EU agreements further. Certain negotiating demands, like the five-
yearly review of GHG reductions, were more acceptable because they had support outside the 
EU. Strict measurement, reporting and verification requirements were added to the EU’s 
negotiating mandate because it feared other parties would weaken the legally binding aspects 
of the Paris Agreement. Moreover, the EU’s decision not to use majority voting to overrule 
Poland on the negotiating mandate makes most sense in the context of international 
negotiations where the EU needed to appear united.

International level

At COP21 the international environment, particularly growing concern about climate change 
and pressure on governments globally to reach an agreement, influenced the range of 
acceptable negotiation compromises and advantaged the EU. Eﬀective diplomacy and 
coalition building, particularly joining the HAC, helped the EU secure its preferred outcomes. 
However, the international level cannot be divorced from the other two levels. France knew that 
by prompting EU member states to undertake climate diplomacy it could reposition actors at 
the international level. The EU had credibility at COP21 because of its ambitious INDC and 
negotiation mandate. Moreover, the EU’s unified image depended on eﬀectively aggregating 
preferences at the EU level and sticking to its agreements. If it wanted to compromise, the EU 
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needed to be aware of the domestic limitations on its member states. Hence it could never 
compromise on decarbonisation because of Poland’s objections, but could compromise on the 
1.5℃ target. 

Interconnected levels 
The inescapable conclusion is that confining one’s analysis to any one or even two levels leads 
to a significantly diminished picture of EU and international climate politics. This thesis has 
provided strong evidence that EU leaders, when negotiating at each level, are aware the 
decisions they make may change: 

1) Whether domestic constituents will support an agreement and the government that 
negotiated it.

2) Whether other member states will tolerate a certain decision and if not, how they react 
to it.

3) How the EU and/or its member states will be viewed internationally, and particularly 
whether other parties will be willing to work with it.

They take these risks into account during negotiations. This explanation, derived from the 
three-level game, is superior to the explanations provided by other theories. 

Academic contributions 
This thesis has made four significant contributions to the literature on EU and international 
climate politics. Firstly, it has made an original contribution by developing the three-level game 
as a model for analysing EU climate politics. The three-level game helps trace actions and 
reactions across the national, supranational and international climate negotiations. This thesis 
has shown that the expansion from a two-level game to a three-level game is analytically 
sound and that the three-level game can provide better insights than many of the frameworks 
previously applied to EU climate politics, like LI, MLG and constructivism. This is the most 
significant contribution this thesis makes to the academic corpus.
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Secondly, it attempts to bridge the gap between IR and EU policymaking literatures. This thesis 
sits at the intersection of those two literatures, which have generally remained 
compartmentalised. In reality there are many commonalities between them, and the insights of 
both are needed to properly understand the EU’s behaviour in international forums. This thesis 
has shown that the EU-specific structures influence the EU’s behaviour internationally. 
Similarly, it has provided strong evidence that EU governments and agencies consider the 
international (as in beyond the EU) ramifications of their behaviours before they act, and are 
influenced by the behaviour of actors outside their borders. There is still work to be done 
teasing out the complementarities between EU and IR literature, but this thesis provides some 
insight into how it can be done.

Thirdly, it has contributed to growing literature on the COP21 negotiations and the Paris 
Agreement. As a conference that delivered a legal binding agreement with 195 parties, the 
conference and agreement deserve academic attention. This thesis adds to that. 

Fourthly, this thesis contributes an important case study on the EU’s behaviour at COP21 to 
climate politics literature. As noted in the introduction, the EU is one of the most ambitious 
actors in global climate politics. Their INDC and negotiating mandate were highly ambitious by 
international standards. This thesis continues the discussion about how that came about. 

Future research opportunities

This thesis has shown that the three-level game is an important and eﬀective tool for analysing 
EU climate politics. Further research could apply the framework to other COPs to unlock new 
insights into the EU's behaviour at the UNFCCC. The three level game could be used in 
comparative studies of COPs. Comparisons of COPs like Cancun (2010) and Durban (2011) 
which are, for want of a better phrase, ‘agenda setting COPs’ with ‘decision making COPs’ like 
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Kyoto (1997), Copenhagen (2009) and Paris (2015), where international agreements are being 
written, may be particularly useful. 
245
This thesis has also been upfront about limiting its scope to discussions on climate mitigation, 
particularly GHG emissions reductions. Future research would benefit from expanding the 
scope of topics considered to climate finance, adaption, and other issues that are prominent 
on the international climate agenda. Taking a broader view of issues in climate negotiations 
may also allow for better understanding of the compromises made at the international level. It 
is possible the EU struck additional side deals with other countries on issues, like climate 
finance, to secure more ambitious legal provisions and transparency frameworks. However, it 
was diﬃcult for the thesis to assess this. 

Finally, scholars need to commit to seriously engaging with how EU and international factors 
both eﬀect the EU’s climate policies and EU policymaking more generally. Although sub-
disciplines like European studies and IR are well entrenched in academia their boundaries are 
somewhat artificial. Scholars should seek to analyse influences on EU policy regardless of 
which political ‘level’ they originate in. If scholars are not prepared to cast the net widely they 
risk drawing incomplete pictures of EU policymaking. This thesis shows that it is possible to 
analyse in depth national, EU and international factors together, and that the three-level game 
can help to do that going forward.

 Charles Parker and Christer Karlsson, "The UN Climate Change Negotiations and the Role of the 245
United States, Assessing American Leadership form Copenhagen to Paris," Environmental Politics 27, 
no. 3 (2018).
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Postscript 
On 19 September 2019, Ursula von de Leyen’s announced her new Commission lineup 
including a new super-portfolio for the ‘European Green Deal’, allocated to Executive Vice-
President Frans Timmermans.  This seems to signal the EU is about to increase its ambition 246
on climate policy again. Yet at all levels of the climate negotiations there are challenges. 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia vetoed a proposal for EU to go carbon 
neutral by 2050 in June 2019.  More problematically, after Brexit the EU will lose a member 247
state which has had the capacity and political will to make deep emissions cuts.  248
Internationally the populist and mercantilist streaks in the Trump administration have slowed 
climate action, and dented the international climate regime. Ultimately climate politics is a 
complicated game. A lot of factors need to line up to accomplish significant climate action. I 
hope Timmermans has been practising his chess.

 Megan Darby, "European Green Deal portfolio handed to EU vice president, in major elevation," 246
Climate Change News, 10 September 2019, https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/09/10/
european-green-deal-portfolio-handed-eu-vice-president-major-elevation/. 
 Sam Morgan, "EU climate deal falls at summit, four countries wield the axe," Euractiv, 21 June 2019, 247
https://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-strategy-2050/news/eu-climate-deal-falls-at-summit-four-
countries-wield-the-axe/.
 Charlotte Burns and Paul Tobin, "The Limits of Ambitious Environmental Policy in Times of Crisis," in 248
European Union External Environmental Policy, ed. Camilla Adelle, Katja Biedenkopf, and Diarmuid 
Torney (Basingstoke: Pulgrave Macmillan, 2018), 320-21, 28-30.
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